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This dissertation investigates the relationships between film and the natural world. 
Building upon extant work in the burgeoning field of Ecocinema, this project attempts to 
move beyond the scholarly work on Ecocinema that satisfies itself with questions of 
representation. The issues and arguments taken up here tend to be more programmatic. 
This work is interested in ecological exchanges, encounters, and relationships, not 
representations. The first chapter introduces the project, its origins, and the philosophical 
motivations for working outside the mode of representation. The second chapter 
excavates a concern for animals and the environment within the margins and subtext of 
classical film theory, arguing that from the outset, scholars have built their understanding 
of film at least partly around its relation to the natural world. The third chapter examines 
closely Godfrey Reggio’s experimental documentary film Koyaanisqatsi in the context of 
looming ecological disaster, Posthumanism, and an increasingly militarized civilian 
population. Chapter four turns its attention onto the photography of Henri Cartier-
Bresson and animals. This chapter takes up Jacques Derrida’s challenge in The Animal 
that Therefore I Am to open the question of animals and pathos in a way that is not itself
! ix!
 pathetic. The final chapter of this dissertation challenges critical consensus regarding the 
status of cinema in the work of Thomas Pynchon. This chapter argues that Gravity’s 
Rainbow, Inherent Vice, and Paul Thomas Anderson’s film adaptation of the novel, 
configure the cinema as a media ecology.   
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION !!!
The seeds of this project began to sprout during the fall of my second year while 
taking a course on documentary film and photography. One of the assignments for that 
class required students to sit alone in the library with a few books of Henri-Cartier-
Bresson’s collected photographs. Looking through the oversized books, whose pages 
were glossy, and heavy enough to suggest Importance, I discovered Cartier-Bresson’s 
photograph of pigs in stalls, taken on a Dutch farm in 1953. This is not his most famous 
photograph; it is not likely to turn up on museum postcards, or grace the cover of a 
journal. But the pigs resonated with me for reasons that continue to evolve. At the time, I 
simply loved animals. I gave up eating them a decade before I saw Cartier-Bresson’s 
photo, I grew up around all kinds of dogs, and I knew that in some way, I wanted them to 
be a part of my scholarly work.  
 In addition to the documentary film and photography course, I was also enrolled 
in a course on Ecocriticism. And this course pollinated my love for Cartier-Bresson’s 
photography. Tubers were sent out as I considered the ideas and texts of this course. And 
for this seminar’s long paper, I began to think through how I could combine a scholarly 
interest in both film and the environment. As I continued to finish up my coursework, one 
of the last courses I took helped me think about how disparate pursuits or areas of 
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humanities scholarship can come together and respond to one another. The course 
addressed literature, philosophy, ethics, and politics; the multi-disciplinary approach of 
this class encouraged me to think about working and writing without concern for 
conventional academic boundaries.  
 Among the key figures for me in this project are some of the touchstones of 
postmodern French philosophy: Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and Jacques Derrida. 
Somewhat counter-intuitively, I work more with Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts from A 
Thousand Plateaus than I do with Deleuze’s two books on cinema. Partly this is because 
Deleuze describes his task in Cinema 1: The Time Image as creating “a taxonomy, an 
attempt at the classification of images and signs” (xxiv). Engaging as Deleuze’s two 
books on cinema are, they are not often or entirely helpful to my own goals—which are 
to chart and explore various relationships and encounters with images, structured by a 
few areas of environmental study within the humanities. As for my work with Derrida, 
part of this project’s overall aims are to answer some of the problems posed by The 
Animal that Therefore I Am. Derrida’s question, for example, of how to approach pathos 
where animals are concerned in a way that is not “pathetic” (26) is for me a very 
important one because it points toward animals’ relation not only to images but also to 
politics. 
 In a sense, the second and third chapters of this dissertation are an attempt to think 
politically about film, photography, the environment, and animals in innovative ways. 
The majority of scholarship that has been done within the expanding field of eco-cinema 
concerns itself with questions of representation. And in many ways, these approaches 
merely expand the priorities and mentalities of identity politics to include the natural 
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world and animals as under-represented, or negatively represented marginal groups. This 
kind of writing has its place, and perhaps it is the best first step in thinking meaningfully 
about the relationship between visual culture and the environment. But it is not my 
concern here. The kind of ideas and theory that this dissertation puts forward proceed not 
in opposition to this kind of writing, but adjacent or in addition to it.  
 My reasons for diverting away from questions of representation stem partly from 
a problem that haunts a significant amount of writing on the cinema. Too often, writing 
on cinema treats a film as nothing more than a plot—which is often where identity 
politics takes hold. (Is a transgressive woman punished? Do people of color get 
homogenized? Etc. etc.) Again, this approach is not without its merits, but I find it 
somewhat limited, where the environment and animals are concerned, as my chapters will 
hopefully demonstrate. The idea that a film can be reduced to a plot for the eyes is an 
injustice not only to the work of film theory, which at its best offers up new kinds of 
experience and exchange between spectator and image, but it is also an injustice to the 
incomparable joy of experiencing a great film, of getting on its wavelength, and of 
breathing its air. Responding only to a plot leaves not nearly enough room to respond to 
the sensation of an image. My second reason for wanting to do something other than a 
kind of eco-identity politics comes from a line in Slavoj Žižek’s book on Deleuze, 
Organs Without Bodies. Near the end of the book, in a section called “Micro-Fascisms”, 
Žižek argues that “the struggle for liberation is not reducible to a struggle for the ‘right to 
narrate,’ to the struggle of deprived marginal groups to freely articulate their position” 
(190). I read these words to mean that liberation entails something more than “positive 
representations” of marginal groups. Of course there ought to be more black filmmakers 
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in Hollywood, and depictions of black culture have to go beyond or work against racist 
stereotypes. But these things alone will not solve our culture’s problems with racist 
policing, economics, or imprisonment. Something more programmatic and fundamental 
is required for liberation. Much of the work that has been done in the field of Eco-
Cinema, however, has yet to move beyond concerns with representation. Gasland alone 
will not end hydraulic fracturing; Blackfish alone will not release SeaWorld’s animals 
into the Pacific. And likewise, liberatory film writing cannot be reduced to writing simply 
on behalf of the (mis)represented other.  
 Of course, the struggle for any kind of liberation is always much more complex 
and daunting than one would like. But this dissertation attempts to move beyond the 
scholarly work on eco-cinema that satisfies itself with questions of representation. The 
issues and arguments I take up here tend to be more programmatic. I am interested in 
ecological exchanges, encounters, and relationships, not representations. I am under no 
illusions that the struggle to stop the wave of mass extinctions, reverse climate change, or 
even to shoot more exciting films is reducible to the theses and analysis of this 
dissertation. But I do think that this project’s ideas can improve and expand ecological 
discourse within the humanities—the importance of which is a point taken up by the 
opening pages of my first chapter.         
 The first chapter of this dissertation attempts to show where some of the moments 
and concepts from classic texts in film theory open a space for ecological or ecocritical 
concerns to enter into visual culture. I argue, on the one hand, that dating back to its 
inception, film theory has maintained at least a marginal interest in film’s relation with 
the environment, and on the other hand that this interdisciplinary approach to film theory 
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and to Ecocriticism produces new kinds of responses, encounters, and experiences with 
images. In other words, classic concepts in film theory already open up or allow for 
ecological approaches to cinema that address—not a film’s representation—but how we 
conceive cinema itself. 
 The second chapter considers a few aspects of the branch of Ecocriticism 
concerned with Posthumanism. This discussion begins with an extended analysis and 
“close viewing” of Rudolph Arnheim and Godfrey Reggio’s documentary film 
Koyaanisqatsi. I argue that the film disrupts the category of the human by expanding our 
visual experience into the realm of the machine. This expansion has important 
connections to and implications for the world we currently inhabit. Koyaanisqatsi 
inaugurates crucial discussions about how we perceive the natural world, how our 
perception is affected by drones and drone films, and also about how the disappearance 
of leisure and a cultural proclivity toward militarization contribute to these perceptions. 
 Chapter three concerns itself with photography and animals. The photograph of 
pigs, taken by Henri Cartier-Bresson, which I mentioned above, invites viewers to 
partake in what Deleuze and Guattari call “becoming-animal.” This invitation is actually 
rejoined by Cartier-Bresson’s writing on photography. I argue that this exchange between 
viewer and photograph is an opportunity to think about a kind of animal politics and 
pathos that avoids the anthropocentric pitfalls of rights-based photography that often 
relies on shock or exploitation. From here I consider a few examples of how images of 
animals often circulate online and on social media in order to confront the humanist or 
anthropocentric imagination that drives this circulation.  
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 The final chapter of this dissertation focuses on the ways in which Thomas 
Pynchon’s novel Gravity’s Rainbow configures cinema and ecology in ways that have 
been ignored by most scholarly writing on Pynchon. This configuration not only holds 
important implications for how humanities scholarship talks about ecology, but it also 
reaches a kind of boiling point in Pynchon’s more recent novel, Inherent Vice, and its 
recent film adaptation. I argue that Inherent Vice is not only linked to Gravity’s Rainbow 
in terms of its treatment of both cinema and the environment, but that Pynchon’s stoner 
beach-novel actually helps illuminate further many of the concerns taken up in the first 
three chapters of this dissertation. And so I end the dissertation with theory, which is 
where I started. I attempt to work out how cinematic adaptation, and scholarly discussion 
thereof, might move closer to adaptation’s Darwinian context. 
 Combined with the quotation from Žižek about liberation not being reducible to 
representation, this dissertation is inspired by the words of Susan Sontag, who ends her 
book On Photography, “[i]mages are more real than anyone could have supposed. And 
just because they are an unlimited resource, one that cannot be exhausted by consumerist 
waste, there is all the more reason to apply the conservationist remedy. If there can be a 
better way for the real world to include images, it will require an ecology not only of real 
things, but of images as well” (180). Her words imply not only that the relationship 
between the “real” world and the world of images is structured ecologically, but they also 
suggest explicitly identify images as a resource. And while Sontag does not specify or 
extrapolate what nutrients or capacities that resource holds, for me, the world of images is 
an opportunity to stretch the reaches of what is possible in the world of the viewer.
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CHAPTER 2. THE ECOLOGICAL MARGINS OF CLASSIC FILM THEORY 
 
2.1. Ecology at the outset 
 A sense of urgency saturates a recent special issue of ISLE (21.1). The special 
issue on Global Warming begins with a pleading question in the interest of confronting 
the ever-intensifying ecological problems that haunt our historical moment and its future: 
“What would it mean to drop everything and seek a new voice and a new vision of reality 
in response to recognition of a global crisis?” (Slovic and Moore1). In the editorial “A 
Call to Writers” which precedes the issue’s scholarly and literary content, editors 
Kathleen Dean Moore and Scott Slovic justify the need for new voices and visions of 
reality with unnervingly calm statements regarding our current historical moment that 
articulate exactly how dire the problems our planet faces are. The editors of ISLE in fact 
push the sense of environmental urgency far enough to make the argument that looming 
ecological devastation necessitates a change in academic work and research across the 
board; citing the 2013 study “Scientific Consensus on Maintaining Humanity’s Life 
Support Systems in the 21st Century” conducted by “Anthony D. Baronsky and 500 
scientists”, they encourage writers to ask themselves what they would say to—and what 
work they might do for—their dying planet (5-6). 
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 In an effort to duly adapt my own research and field of study to the urgency ISLE 
20.1 disseminates, I want to answer the challenges and questions Moore and Slovic pose. 
In short, I want to force myself to ask the question “why study films as the planet rapidly 
deteriorates?” A number of other questions necessarily follow: How to study films in 
light of planetary devastation? What do the fields of Ecocriticism and film studies offer 
one another? What kinds of scholarly, aesthetic, and political transformations result from 
these offerings?  
 These questions will consistently prompt and direct the thrust of this dissertation. 
But prior to any scholarship, I want to point out and take seriously that, contrary to a 
popular expression, life imitates art where the cinema is concerned. The cut, integral to so 
many of cinema’s effects and beauties, structures both cinematic and biological vision. 
The eyelid, ever-so-briefly, constantly shutters our vision. And what is a staring contest, 
if not a test of one’s capacity to endure the intensity of a long take of the world? Every 
kid can tell you that a proper staring contest must happen face-to-face, with your 
opponent’s face in close-up. I hope that from an academic point of view, the silliness of 
raising this point in a dissertation measures just how thoroughly norms and conventions 
have cordoned off life from the screen. It is time to resuscitate film studies in the most 
literal way: film theory will become more lively by incorporating ecology; the study of 
relations between life forms will enliven film studies deadened by conventional 
approaches.      
To begin, I contend that one reason to study films now—at the outset of global 
warming’s effects—is because the cinema is in many ways conducive to imaging the 
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ideas and causes of ecocritical priorities and politics. The combination of these two fields 
of study is not without precedent, as I also contend that ecological, animal, and 
posthuman concerns comprise a continuous thread that runs throughout the subtext and 
margins of nearly every major region of film theory dating back to its earliest days. This 
chapter will be a kind of theoretical excavation that dusts off old and familiar works of 
film theory and highlights their connections to these fields without losing sight of the 
works’ original significance. This excavation reveals an ecocritical thread in film theory. 
So actually, there are two beginnings or outsets here which prompt what has come to be 
called ecocinematic film theory: the beginning of climate change’s noticeable effects on 
our world—and a new vision and voice for research in the humanities they demand—and 
the outset of moving images, how people wrote about them, and how to look at them. 
A number of ecocritical scholars have attempted to bridge cinematic and 
environmental/ecological research. For the most part, these scholars have worked in one 
of two modes. The most common mode comprises analysis of films in which ecocritical 
priorities, politics, and ideas are imaged in either “positive” or “negative” terms, 
depending upon the outcome of a given film’s plot. As far as fiction films are concerned, 
this kind of work tends to highlight disaster films (The Day After Tomorrow, e.g.) so-
called “activist films” (such as Erin Brockovitch) and science fiction B-films from the 
1950’s and 1960’s (Invasion of the Body Snatchers.)  
The second most common kind of writing that treats the cinema from an 
ecocritical view often works as a catalogue of the first. The major essays here are Scott 
MacDonald’s essay “Toward an Eco-Cinema” and Adrian Ivakhiv’s “Green Film 
Criticism and Its Futures.” Ivakhiv’s text is especially helpful because it carefully 
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distinguishes between a surprising number of approaches that make up the “ecocritical 
film analysis” mode of writing. As Ivakhiv draws these distinctions, he also explains the 
stakes and philosophical underpinnings of each approach, illuminating the ways in which 
various approaches to Ecocriticism produce differing kinds of analyses. In the case of 
MacDonald’s steps “Toward an Eco-Cinema,” MacDonald’s comments on particular 
films tend to overshadow his theory-oriented ideas about how cinema might relate to the 
environment. Still, MacDonald makes a valuable theoretical argument where he envisions 
“the fundamental job of an ecocinema as a retraining of perception, as a way of offering 
an alternative to conventional media-spectatorship” that materializes as “something like a 
garden—an ‘Edenic’ respite from conventional consumerism—within the machine of 
modern life, as modern life is embodied by the apparatus of media” (109). MacDonald’s 
wording here is a reference to his book-length work, The Garden in the Machine: A Field 
Guide to Independent Films about Place, which investigates the ways in which specific 
films interact with specific places—which is not exactly the same question I’m 
investigating here which is how film interacts with the natural world. But to my mind, 
what’s missing from the work that has been done thus far on the environment and film is 
an attempt to expand the work of film theory into the territory of ecology and 
Ecocriticism. The relationship between cinematic and photographic images and the 
environment is almost altogether un-theorized, with the exception of passing remarks in 
essays focused elsewhere.  
Put another way, many of the writers who have worked with film and the 
environment have tended to do so almost exclusively with Ecocriticism as their starting 
point and emphasis (hence the two dominant modes of writing I mention in the previous 
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paragraph.) Cinema seems to be merely invited to a party hosted by Ecocritical scholars. 
Rather than being a point of departure into new meditations, this kind of work merely 
applies a few interpretive strategies onto images. As a result, the rich offerings of film 
theory have been left almost entirely out of the conversation about the relationship 
between film and the environment. From what I have found, it seems that only a few film 
scholars are infusing their work with ecocritical concerns. This project will address this 
gap in scholarship in order to highlight the importance of cinematic experience for 
Ecocriticism and to articulate new viewing experiences for film studies.  
Ecocriticism, Animal Studies, and Posthumanism are three separate but affiliated 
modes of inquiry in the humanities. They are not without some inter- and intra-
disciplinary conflicts. My intention in this project is not necessarily to intervene in such 
disputes. Rather, I want to gather together various questions, concepts, and investigations 
these fields make possible regardless of their place within disciplinary disputes. In many 
ways, film and photography will be my starting point, and so they will prompt my 
investigations in Ecocriticism, Animal Studies, and Posthumanism. Because my 
exploration of eco-film theory will be an assemblage of parts borrowed from these 
disciplines, a term that can accommodate this breadth will be helpful. To call my work 
here an eco-film theory might be in some ways misleading or incomplete. For example, 
the eco- prefix does not necessarily make a good heading for the work I’ll do with 
animals given the ways in which Animal Studies has been a departure from Ecocriticism 
in recent years. Additionally, I hear in “eco-“ a fashionable—if not empty—bourgeois 
attempt to claim solidarity with serious environmentalism. Referring, however, to this 
project as a geo-film theory after the geophilosophy articulated by Deleuze and Guattari 
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in What is Philosophy? might be closer to what I have in mind. According to the OED, 
the prefix geo- “form[s] words related to the earth.” This simple and unsurprising 
definition points toward the central aim of my dissertation: to conceptualize a relation 
between film and earth that accommodates environmental/ecological concerns, animals, 
and the instability of the category we call “human.” Still, the aims and pursuits of this 
project are not strictly Deleuzian and so geo-film theory is not quite right either. Because 
I wish to enter into the budding field of Ecocinematic Studies, I will continue to use this 
idiom, even as I contest its most common forms and arguments and reject the way in 
which “eco-“ has become a commodified prefix for nearly any kind of consumer product.  
Although I will return to them in depth at the end of this chapter, what I find helpful from 
Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy by way of introduction here is their statement: 
“The concept is…not projective but connective; not hierarchical but linking” (91). My 
work toward a geo-film theory (Deleuze and Guattari’s idiom prefers “concept” to theory 
but I want to position this work within the field of film theory) proceeds according to 
these descriptors by connecting the study of film with the areas mentioned above, non-
hierarchically, in order to produce new possibilities for studying cinema and photography 
in an era where it has become necessary to prioritize ecological concerns.  
 
2.2.  Eisenstein and Germination 
After a discussion of the Kuleshov effect in his essay, “The Cinematographic 
Principle and the Ideogram” Eisenstein forcefully declares: “The shot is by no means an 
element of montage. / The shot is a montage cell” (37). Eisenstein makes this claim in 
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order to combat what he calls the “pernicious make-shift analysis” that suggests montage 
is simply “[b]ricks, arranged in series to expound an idea” as Eisenstein builds toward his 
famous dictum that “montage is conflict” (36-8). But within this famous passage of film 
theory, where Eisenstein gives a theoretical account of his own visually jarring editing 
style, film scholars overlook the idea that a shot is a cell as opposed to an element—this 
difference in fact gives montage its capacity for conflict. Cinema, then, despite its 
technology relying upon exposures, chemicals, and emulsions, shares kinship with 
biology as opposed to chemistry. Eisenstein elaborates the cellular, biological conflict of 
a cell-shot that produces montage; he writes, “[j]ust as cells in their division form a 
phenomenon of another order, the organism or embryo, so, on the other side of the 
dialectical leap from the shot, there is montage” (37). Counterintuitive to what one might 
expect, montage is not the result of a process that resembles a chemical compound, where 
discrete elements bond to one another in order to form a molecule that could be called 
montage. Instead, the process that produces montage is more like mitosis or meiosis. For 
Eisenstein, then the motion picture is the development of a living organism. 
For as long as there has been film theory, there have been theorists who regret the 
cinema’s infantile state. In a sense, film theory’s numerous schools and approaches are 
merely about finding new ways to say that cinema remains in its infancy. Written in 
1963, long after the cinematic inventions of sound and color, Stan Brakhage’s Metaphors 
on Vision says that “The devout, who break popcorn together in your humblest double-
feature services, know that [the cinema is] still being born”  (Brakhage 229). Siegfried 
Kracauer accounts for cinema’s existence as though it were “Like the embryo in the 
womb”, developing from the photograph and the daguerreotype before it. And although 
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he does not agree with the sentiment, Antonin Artaud begins his essay “Sorcery and the 
Cinema” (a crucial piece of film theory for my third chapter) with “We hear it endlessly 
repeated that the cinema is in its infancy and that we’re only witnessing its first 
stammerings” (Artaud 103). But whereas most film theorists who raise this point do so in 
order to complain about what films are popular, Eisenstein’s writing says cinema is in its 
infancy not because of the fledgling films of popular cinema but because montage itself is 
a kind of embryo. The question to address, then, is what kind of organism is the cinema? 
Regardless of historical periods or geographical determinations, the cinema grows 
into any number of various life forms. Identifying, naming, or classifying these life forms 
is not necessarily productive. In Strike, for example, Eisenstein’s montage cells divide 
into both slaughtered calves and repressed workers. What could one call this kind of 
cinematic life? And how would such a naming enhance a viewer’s experience of the 
film? The point, here, is that whatever it is about the cinema that belongs to the realm of 
bios or the organic complicates the natural-cultural divide that relegates the cinema to the 
term “plastic art.” Instead of upholding such a conventional binary, the cinema and its 
theorization spoils (or deconstructs in Derrida’s idiom) the misguided, but still widely 
maintained, binary that cordons the natural off from the cultural.  
 
2.3. Vertov, Derrida, and l’animot 
One of the most salient ideas from Jacques Derrida’s book The Animal that 
Therefore I Am is that the history of philosophy has treated all animals as effectively the 
same and interchangeable. As a response, Derrida posits the philosophical concept of 
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“l’animot” as an attempt to address philosophy’s shortcomings, and to open up a path that 
allows more nuanced reflection on animals (plural.) What Derrida does not make explicit, 
however, is where his concept actually shows itself. Derrida often uses literary criticism 
and interpretation in order to clarify and concretize his philosophy (see Specters of Marx 
or “Ulysses Gramophone: Hear Say Yes in Joyce”), but the l’animot concept remains 
fairly abstract in The Animal that Therefore I Am. Of course the entire lecture is prompted 
by Derrida’s reflection on encountering his cat while nude—an anecdote Derrida 
recounts in the text. But unlike Derrida’s discussion of Hamlet in Specters of Marx, 
which illustrates his configuration of the spectral and the political, Derrida explicates 
l’animot almost entirely in relation to a philosophical history that ties Descartes, Lacan, 
and Heidegger together vis-à-vis philosophy’s improvident consideration of animals. The 
cinema, however, is uniquely suited to image and concretize, Derrida’ concept. 
 The first aspect of Derrida’s concept of l’animot, laid out early in The Animal 
that Therefore I Am (More to Follow) concerns the fact that “[t]here is no Animal in the 
general singular” (47). The problem Derrida observes here is that although giraffes are 
not interchangeable with dolphins, which are not interchangeable with moose, and so on, 
philosophy’s default setting when it attempts to address animals is to homogenize the 
entire animal kingdom into a single mass category. Investigating animal being under the 
assumption that there is no substantive ontological variation between animals no matter 
the species—not to mention variation within a given species—is imprecise and 
inauspicious, considering the absurdity of what underpins that mode of investigation. 
Employing the term “the Animal” as though a “general singular” animal actually existed, 
assumes that domesticated cats experience the world in the same way as hermit crabs 
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because whatever can be said about “the Animal” must be true of all animals since the 
term attempts to put all disparate animal species onto a single ontological ark. Derrida 
rightly calls readers’ attention to the dubious character of the term. For Derrida, then, the 
term l’animot replaces “the Animal” by “hav[ing] the plural animals heard in the 
singular” (47) due to a homonym in French between the “aux” of “animaux,” as in 
animals plural, and “ot” of “mot,” the singular for “word.” 
But why overlay the word “animals” with the word “word?” The second and third 
components Derrida lays out vis-à-vis “l’animot” confront the commonly held view that 
language is the principal thing that fundamentally separates humans from animals. (I’ll 
describe them here conjointly because they are more intimately linked to each other than 
the general plural idea of the first.) Derrida includes “mot” as his concept’s suffix so as to 
attach a reminder that it is a mistake philosophically to erase or downplay the important 
differences between human and animal existence. Derrida encourages readers to resist the 
temptation to “‘[give] speech back’ to animals” in order to attempt to “think the absence 
of the name and of the word otherwise, and as something other than a privation” (48). 
The question, then, is how to perceive the absence of speech as something other than a 
lack or deprivation of speech.  
I think that there are two obvious models for thinking absence in non-negative 
terms. The first has to do with color. In rudimentary terms, the eye perceives specific 
colors when particular frequencies are reflected, rather than absorbed. So a tennis ball, for 
example, absorbs all of the light that produces every color except the light that makes its 
particular shade of green. A tennis ball’s bright green color is actually the effect of its 
light not being retained by the ball. The second possibility for thinking animals’ absent 
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speech as something other than lack has to do with necessity or redundancy. When I hear, 
for example, “Come on in My Kitchen” by Robert Johnson, I do not think “wow, this 
song lacks a good trombone part…” The simply arranged acoustic guitar-based song is 
indeed a musical abundance; all instruments but an acoustic guitar may be absent, but the 
song lacks nothing. These two examples—a tennis ball and “Come on in My Kitchen”—
might begin to approach absence as something other than lack.       
Cinema and photography are particularly suited to answer Derrida’s challenge to 
think philosophically about animals in terms of l’animot. The task entails three central 
facets: give due attention to the specificity and heterogeneity of animal species so as to 
avoid the trap of a general singular animal, resist anthropomorphism and the facile 
overlapping of human and animal being, and finally to think absent speech as something 
besides lack. Literature and painting may also be well-suited to l’animot, but if “The 
close-up is the soul of cinema” (Epstein 236), as Jean Epstein believes, then films place 
audiences into face-to-face encounters that separate cinema from other art forms. (I will 
discuss in chapter three the significance of animals in close-up in Georges Franju’s Blood 
of the Beasts.)   
An animal cannot appear on screen or in a photograph in general. There are no 
images of unspecified animals—and in that adjective I hope to carry along the word’s 
relation to species. Without opening up a discussion here about medium specificity, the 
narrator of a novel for instance, might tell readers that a character was afraid of an 
encounter with an animal, or heard an animal sound without specifying the animal in 
question, but a film or a photograph cannot maintain ambiguity where animals are 
concerned. A photograph can be blurred in order to keep an animal’s species a mystery, 
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but that the ambiguity in that case rests on a distorting effect is telling. In order for an 
animal to appear unidentifiable in a photograph, a photographer has to in a sense violate 
the techniques and practices (measuring light, timing the exposure, e.g.) that produce an 
ambiguous animal. In no way is this to say a photographer shouldn’t violate or 
experiment with the conventions of photography, I merely want to highlight 
photography’s relationship with the concept of l’animot where a clear image of a bull will 
always announce the species Bos Taurus. 
In terms of Derrida’s third proposition concerning l’animot, Dziga Vertov, 
provides an apt cinematic example of where and how l’animot brushes up against the 
cinema. Vertov’s brief essay “On the Significance of Nonacted Cinema” is on the whole 
a manifesto against the romantic commercial films that populated the screen in his (and 
indeed our) day. As Vertov asserts the things that separate his cadre of Soviet filmmakers 
from popular cinema, he argues that cinema is not nearly cinematic enough: “every 
motion picture is a mere literary skeleton covered with a film skin. At best some film-fat 
and film-flesh beneath that skin…We never see the film-skeleton…we have no film-
objects” (36 emphasis mine). What I want to call attention to in this quotation is that for 
Vertov, popular films’ abundance of literary qualities (romance, narrative) is in fact a 
cinematic restriction. And Vertov pushes this argument much further near the conclusion 
of the essay. Vertov contends that “by establishing a clear visual link between subjects, 
we have significantly weakened the importance of intertitles; in so doing we have 
brought the movie screen closer to the uneducated viewers, which is particularly 
important at present” (38). Here all of my interests come to the forefront, hand in hand. 
The elimination of speech—manifest in silent films via the intertitle—is for Vertov a 
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serious accomplishment. For Vertov, the absence of (cinematic) speech is not a privation 
but a bounty as it frees up his films to become film-objects. In other words, producing 
film-objects depends largely on absenting speech. This is a context that not only makes it 
possible to “think the absence of…the word otherwise, and as something other than a 
privation,” Vertov’s cinema actively encourages it. 
I’m left, however, with the question of where and how animals relate to Vertov’s 
moment of film theory and history. The short answer here is that since language is 
philosophy’s favorite divisor between humans and animals, then absenting language from 
the cinema brushes audiences up against something animal in their experience of a film-
object, “a finished étude of absolute vision, rendered exact and deepened by all existing 
optical instruments, principally by the movie camera experimenting in space and time” 
(Vertov 37).  
 [etude=study; specify what animal experience vision puts us in contact with, apparatus is 
a bridge to experience—not a mediation/distortion of truth] 
 
2.4. Bazin, Cartier-Bresson 
In one of the most famous essays in visual culture, André Bazin’s “The Ontology 
of the Photographic Image,” Bazin articulates photography’s inherent relation to 
preservation through the process of embalming. As Bazin begins to distinguish 
photography from painting, he argues that “[a]ll the arts are based on the presence of 
man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence. Photography affects us 
like a phenomenon in nature, like a flower or a snowflake whose vegetable or earthly 
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origins are an inseparable part of their beauty.” (13) The easy, and superficial reading of 
Bazin’s lines would emphasize—and go no further than—Bazin’s recourse to the natural 
world to discuss photography’s “nature.” Sure, it’s nice and quaint to think that a good 
photograph is like a flower: neither photograph nor the flower require the viewer’s 
knowledge of the chemical reactions involved in their creation, they ask only to be 
appreciated talis quails.  
I want to explore something else, however. I am actually more interested in the 
first idea in the quotation. What is the advantage photography derives from human 
absence? Even more basically, what does it mean for humans to be absent from 
photography? Unlike, say, flowers and snowflakes, photographs do not occur without 
photographers. The photographic absence of humans needs some clarification. If 
meteorology explains to humans how snowflakes occur, and ecology explains to humans 
how flowers blossom, then what explains to humans how they are absent from something 
that depends on them for existence?  
My answer here has something to do with the way Vertov’s elimination of 
subtitles in The Man with a Movie Camera overlaps human cinematic experience with the 
absence of language that partly defines animals’ being. I would argue that photography, 
the activity of taking photographs and of viewing them, is a becoming-animal in 
Deleuzian terms, where what humans understand to be the non-languaged experience of 
animals passes through the languaged human, that helps explain Bazin’s statement that 
photography “derives an advantage from [human] absence.” More recently, Akira Mizuta 
Lippit has similarly stated that “the photograph provides a moment with radical absence” 
(Lippit 172). The substance of this radicalism, what makes the encounter radical, is the 
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way photographic images decenter and destabilize the human being and its default 
settings for encountering the world. Images have the capacity to jettison the trappings of 
anthropocentrism in favor of tapping into whatever remains of animal being within the 
human species. 
 It is important here to distinguish photography (and cinema by extension) from 
painting. Bazin underscores the absence of the human by highlighting the mechanical 
process of producing a photograph: “For the first time an image of the world is formed 
automatically, without the creative intervention of man” (13). With painting, however, 
the style and personality of the artist is implicitly bound up with the process of creating 
an image. (It’s not just an arresting use of light, it’s Vermeer’s light; It’s not just a wild 
brushstroke, it’s Van Gogh’s wild brushstroke.) For Bazin, “The personality of the 
photographer enters into the proceedings only in his selection of the object to be 
photographed” (13 emphasis mine). In his essay “Painting and Cinema”, Bazin makes an 
interesting point about the frame: 
Indeed it is a mistake to see a picture frame as having a merely decorative or 
rhetorical function. The fact that it emphasizes the compositional quality of the 
painting is of secondary importance. The essential role of the frame is, if not to 
create at least to emphasize the difference between the microcosm of the picture 
and the macrocosm of the natural world in which the painting has come to take its 
place. This explains the baroque complexity of the traditional frame whose job it 
is to establish something that cannot be geometrically established—namely the 
discontinuity between the painting and the wall, that is to say between the paining 
and reality. (165) 
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Painting, then, does not promote an encounter with absence. For Bazin, painting is about 
bringing the world of the viewer (which Bazin calls reality) in touch with a different 
world that lies within the painting inside the frame. Photography, on the other hand, is 
about encountering absence; photography asks the viewer to encounter a point of time 
and space that belongs to the world of the viewers but for which they are absent.  
As he writes about the work of photographing, Henri Cartier-Bresson describes 
“becom[ing] serious” about photography, Cartier-Bresson says: “I was on the scent of 
something, and I was busy smelling it out” (20). This is an odd way to talk about 
photography. Smells and images seem to be incompatible with each other. How could 
Cartier-Bresson photograph a smell? Likewise, what does a photograph offer your nose? 
In his book Electric Animal, Akira Mizuta Lippit observes that “[t]hinking about smell 
possesses a long history in Western philosophy, converging at times with the discourse 
on animality” (122).  
What is fascinating in Cartier-Bresson’s writing is that—philosophically—he 
does not so much theorize a way to “smell” a photograph as much as he argues that smell, 
a regressive sense according to humanist philosophy, opens up the space for creativity; 
for Cartier-Bresson, adopting an animal-like engagement with the world allows 
photography to happen. Lippit provides a concise history of scent’s place in philosophical 
discourse on animals that touches on Plato, Freud, Horkheimer and Adorno, and Vicki 
Hearne. With the exception of Hearne, philosophy tends to disparage smell. For Plato, 
smell is at odds with thought, For Freud, smell and its complex relation to memory is a 
vehicle of repression. Adorno and Horkheimer relate smell to shame. Directly following 
this discussion of smell’s history in philosophy, Lippit shifts his attention to Deleuze and 
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Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal. It is as though Lippit suggests the concept of 
becoming-animal as a rebuttal to philosophy’s typical dismissal of bestial smell. 
The cinema itself is in fact  “bestial” in the sense that it is so disgustingly 
entwined with capitalist mentalities that it comes to resemble something Derrida points 
out about livestock (and other animals as well.) Derrida writes, in one of the flashes of 
crystal clarity that make The Animal that Therefore I Am particularly compelling, “to cut 
straight to the chase, what the nonrational animal is deprived of, along with subjecthood, 
is what Kant calls ‘dignity’…that is to say, an internal and priceless value, the value of an 
end in itself, or if you prefer, a price above any comparable or negotiable price, above 
any market price. There can be a negotiable market price for the animal” (100). The 
filiation here between the cinema and animals here by virtue of their subordination to the 
market is clear. Disavowal structures the filiation: with respect to animals, we know very 
well that these “commodities” are lives, lives that not only suffer, but that also occupy a 
particular and essential place in a given ecosystem, but they pose opportunities for human 
profit nonetheless. Likewise, we know very well that the cinema comprises art and that as 
Heidegger points out valuing art devalues it, but this is a medium with enormous global 
appeal, and therefore poses an immense opportunity for profit. Of course, I do not want to 
equate the abhorrent conditions animals that exist for profit endure with the crassness of 
the studio system, but I want to highlight what Derrida might call a filiation between the 
two where subjugation to capital is concerned.  
 The important question here is how this filiation plays out. And what paths of 
escape exist. Robert Bresson’s heartbreaking and understated Au Hasard, Balthasar 
provides a good case study for the relationship between capital, animals, and images. 
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Although viewers see the titular donkey Balthasar subjected to several different owners 
during the film’s drama, Bresson refuses to put the transactions that shuffle Balthasar 
from owner to owner on screen. It is precisely this directorial decision that imbues 
Balthasar with a certain dignity in the film. It is as though seeing Balthasar being sold 
would undermine his dignified position as a kind of Greek chorus in the film, observing 
without commenting. As Coetzee’s protagonist Elizabeth Costello declares, “Animals 
have only their silence left with which to confront us” (25). And as Akira Lippit points 
out, in his reading of Giorgio Agamben, “What flows from the animal touches language 
without entering into it, dissolving memory, like the unconscious, into a timeless present” 
(166). I take the phrase timeless present” here, where Balthasar is concerned, to mean 
that not only do animals live (as far as we can tell) almost exclusively in the present (at 
least that which we humans call the present), without becoming preoccupied with what 
tomorrow might bring, and although animals certainly possess something like memory, 
they are not burdened by the past. This animal temporality that Lippit describes becomes 
important in Bresson’s film, as viewers must “catch up” with Balthasar as we realize he 
has come to be owned by someone new. Viewers must adjust their expectations and in a 
sense, begin watching the film anew, learning what they can about Balthasar’s new lives. 
Lippit’s lush description here of how animals collide with language without taking part in 
it serves as an equally compelling analysis of Au Hasard, Balthasar. Seeing Balthasar 
with new owners without having seen the donkey be exchanged indeed “dissolves 
memory” producing a “timeless present” because it is often unclear in the film for how 
long Balthasar has lived in new circumstances by the time viewers recognize that an 
exchange has taken place. Bresson establishes this effect early on in the film as a cut 
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jarringly moves from Balthasar as a young donkey, to a shot of Balthasar’s new owner 








The cut is jarring for a few reasons. Balthasar’s youth is a point of emphasis nearly each 
time he appear on screen before this cut. His wonderfully fluffy and soft-looking coat, the 
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rapport with the children, and the visual comparisons of their small bodies each work to 
impress upon viewers that Balthasar is just a baby. The cut to a new owner 
simultaneously signals a new time for viewers, and we must adjust quickly to Balthasar’s 
present. As Balthasar comes under the watch of new owners, the film calls up hazy 
memories of previous owners where time is very difficult to pin down or determine. 
Lippit’s comments also extend to the nature of the cinema itself. Without here completely 
opening up a discussion devoted to the specificity of the cinematic medium, I’ll say that 
images always happen in the present tense. Barthes comments on this phenomenon 
extensively, where photography is concerned, in Camera Lucida, and in films, even films 
that take place in the past, or that include sequences of flashback—indicating that they 
are past—the viewer experiences them in the present. There are two important 
connections with Derrida’s work here to note. First, that absence (of images of 
transaction) is productive, something other than privation. Secondly, the film is an 
exercise in the antagonism between “market price for the animal” and dignity. Whatever 
price the film’s characters negotiate for Balthasar’s exchange, Bresson refuses to image 
it. What viewers are left with is a cinematic encounter with an animal that indeed has 
value “above any market price.” This idea lends a political significance to the relationship 
between animals and cinema. And although animals will become the focus of my third 
chapter, Francesco Casetti’s argument that “on the screen…we see what we have 
become” (85) will continue to think through the political dimension of this conversation. 
What I argue for is something slightly more complex than a mirror’s reflection. My 
primary focus for chapter two picks up on this conversation as it plays out in Godfrey 
Reggio’s ecologically-tinged 1983 documentary Koyaanisqatsi.
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Why do we enjoy and share drone footage? One of my undergraduate students 
recently told me that he regularly enjoys watching the images someone took while flying 
their drone through Chernobyl. Friends in my Facebook feed like, share, and re-post 
drone footage taken at abandoned amusement parks; one popular drone clip on YouTube 
featuring dolphins swimming and breaking at Dana Point, CA has garnered over ten and 
a half million views. But why? How do drone and GoPro technologies combine to 
produce a particular kind of cinematic enjoyment that differs from what is found in both 
Hollywood action movies and a certain genre of time-lapse documentary films that 
includes Godfrey Reggio’s Koyaanisqatsi and Rob Fricke’s Baraka? How could these 
films’ popularity be anything other than a frightening example of the ways in which 
civilian consciousness, desire, and entertainment is fast becoming increasingly 
militarized?  
When amazon.com inevitably begins using drones to deliver packages to my 
door, am I naïve enough to believe that I am—from the drone’s point of view—
fundamentally different from the Syrian, Pakistani, or Yemeni civilians and military 
targets who regularly receive deadly drone deliveries from the US military? On what 
grounds am I different? Of course it should certain be pointed out that plenty of 
transportation technologies (planes, helicopters, e.g.) maintain a military usage and 
! 29 
importance that does not impinge upon civilian life and that the fact of their appropriation 
by the military-industrial complex does not necessarily sound the alarm about their place 
in civilian life. (Should I ever require Life Flight, for example, I would gladly accept it.) 
The difference with drones and their emergence onto the cultural landscape is that they 
are affordable. Unlike an airplane, one does not need excessive amounts of wealth to own 
one. Still something of a novelty, a drone can be purchased for personal use for less than 
the cost of an iPhone. And that they are part of an ongoing process of militarizing civilian 
life is underscored by the camouflage paint job adorning one popular model, the Parrot 
AR Drone 2.0.  
 
Figure 3.1 
The idea that drones contribute to the breakdown in military and civilian spheres extends 
well beyond one drone’s paint job. Questions relating to time-sensitivity, “precision”, and 
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decreases in paid personnel motivate both the military’s increasing reliance upon drones 
and my future amazon delivery. In multiple contexts, drones already haunt our future. I 
use “haunt” here to describe the not-yet-material reality that lurks in our future, and at the 
same time as to register the hundreds of civilian casualties whose lives have ended as 
collateral damage in drone strikes on “appropriate” military targets. 
At the outset of his book War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, Manuel De 
Landa argues that “even if Artificial Intelligence is not at present sufficiently 
sophisticated to create true ‘killer robots,’ when synthetic intelligence does make its 
appearance on the planet, there will already be a predatory role awaiting it” (1). Likewise, 
drones’ military origins insure that as (adequately wealthy) westerners become 
increasingly enamored and owners of drone technology, and the smooth flight-like 
images they produce, the distinction between military and civilian or recreational usage is 
already lost. How long before drone ownership and second amendment fanaticism collide 
in increasingly tragic outcomes?  
 
3.2. Nonhuman Vision 
I show my undergraduate students the 1983 documentary film Koyaanisqatsi; they 
are bored. And yet, how different are the images of Koyaanisqatsi from drone and GoPro 
images? (Especially considering the slow, birds-eye-view sequences of desert expanse.) 
Doesn’t Reggio’s camera offer the same attractions? Flight simulation, recognizable 
locations, views impossible to get from on the ground or with the naked eye alone? 
Perhaps the crucial difference is that Koyaanisqatsi points toward an important 
! 31 
distinction between mechanical and militarized vision. And because we already inhabit 
the mechanical vision Koyaanisqatsi predicts, we are well-prepared to receive the 
militarized camerawork of drones. 
The various bonds, divisions, and transformations between humans and machines 
are not new subjects for the philosophy of Posthumanism or for film theory. Many film 
scholars point to Dziga Vertov as film theory’s formative voice advocating for cinema to 
assert itself as an art form by becoming more mechanical. In his book The Language of 
New Media, Lev Manovich takes Vertov and his film Man with a Movie Camera “as [his] 
guide to the language of new media” (xv) and indeed the book serves as a kind of 
exploration in the logical extensions of the idea that movies are mechanical and what it 
means for images to detach from celluloid in the internet age. Vertov himself concludes 
“WE: Variant of a Manifesto” by exclaiming “Hurrah for the poetry of machines, 
propelled and driving; the poetry of levers, wheels, and wings of steel” (9). But the 
question of human-machine relationships is duly important for the inclusion of ecology 
within the broad range of humanities scholarship (Ecocriticism.) Ron Burnett in fact  
use[s] the term ecology in reference to the indivisible nature of human-machine 
relations and the interdependence of humans on the technologies the create. 
Ecology does not necessarily mean harmony or an ideal balance of forces and 
energies that sustain the connections between humans and machines. Rather, 
ecology is a term that suggests the many interrelationships that people develop 
between each other to engage with the communities of which they are a part. (72) 
Indeed for reasons I will elaborate below, Koyaanisqatsi is an important ecological film 
precisely because of the imbalances it recognizes and confronts viewers with. Although 
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his focus is not exactly ecological, Graham Cairns notes that Reggio’s film “us[es] the 
natural characteristics of the landscape to play with viewer perception” (78). This “play 
with viewer perception” is precisely what I find most striking about Reggio’s film—
Koyaanisqatsi puts each of these concerns—the human, the machine, the ecological, and 
the cinematic—into a single disruptive documentary constellation.  
The subjects of Reggio’s film are generally banal. Some of the film’s most 
memorable images are of desert, clouds, pedestrians, and cars. But the film’s effect is 
anything but banal. The intensity of the images—particularly toward the film’s end—is 
profound. Koyaanisqatsi‘s bracing rhythms, repetitions, and juxtapositions actually 
transform the experience of ordinary, commonplace objects into something disorienting 
and extraordinary. Part of the reason these ordinary subjects become extraordinary is due 
to art’s capacity for defamiliarization. Russian formalist Victor Shklovsky explains that 
“art removes objects from the automatism of perception” and “makes the familiar seem 
strange” (779). Koyaanisqatsi’s images of ordinary things and scenes acquire an 
additional measure of strangeness, however, because the camera images them through 
nonhuman eyes.  
Unlike the demonstrative camera of, say, Alfred Hitchcock, which seems at times 
to insist “ Hey! Make sure you see and remember this!”, as in Psycho when the camera 
moves in on Marion’s motel room nightstand, where she has folded a newspaper over 
stolen money, Godfrey Reggio’s camera is unnervingly impassive. It stares at city traffic 
for twenty-four hours without blinking. And when it moves, it moves not to point 
something out to readers but to intensify its state. In one memorable instance, the camera 
fixes upon a wooden-faced pilot, whose unfeeling expression perfectly matches the 
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camera’s own. But as the camera approaches the pilot, it is not at all like the camera’s 
approach to Marion’s nightstand. Reggio’s camera seems to want to get closer in the 
same way a poker player with a winning hand wants to raise a bet; if it’s a staring contest 
this pilot wants, it’s a staring contest he will certainly get from Reggio’s camera. And the 
camera will win—it actually seems to look through the pilot as much as it looks at him.  
 
Figure 3.2 
And so in this moment of intense staring, Koyaanisqatsi sets mechanical and human 
vision against one another, quite literally face-to-lens. This moment, roughly halfway 
through Reggio’s film, where two visual registers consider one another, becomes a point 
of entry for considering cinematic experience. Although it reaches a kind of pinnacle 
while tracking in on the pilot, the camera’s mechanical, impartial demeanor is clearly 
established in the film’s first twenty or so minutes, where the camera is content to linger 
in vast desert spaces, hover over seemingly endless oceans, and drift in between clouds. 
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Rudolph Arnheim’s famous book, Film as Art, distinguishes clearly between the 
content and the form of an image. Discussing a hypothetical image of a boat seen from 
high above, Arnheim says “the result is a view very seldom seen in real life. The interest 
is thereby diverted from the subject [the boat] to the form [the boat’s presentation]…The 
spectator is thus brought to see something familiar as something new. At this moment 
[the spectator] becomes capable of true observation…the objects themselves become 
more vivid and therefore more capable of effect” (43-4). The camera’s methodical 
surveying of the desert achieves this effect. The camera peers a little too slowly around 
rock formations, and it lingers on a scene in which nothing happens for what seems to be 
a little too long. I say too slowly and too long because the pacing of Reggio’s camera is a 
distinct and uncomfortable break with the way we look at the natural world off-screen.  
Reggio’s trip through the American southwest is not a vacation to see the Grand 
Canyon. Instead, Reggio radically challenges viewers’ attention spans, which are 
conditioned and ever-shortened by any number of aspects of a “life out of balance.” The 
film’s opening sequences are a dare: Reggio’s deliberate camera mockingly dares us 
human viewers to be bored by the beauty of the southwest, and by Reggio’s generously 
lengthy presentation of it. And so what happens is that viewers recalibrate, we have no 
choice but to align our visual sensibilities with the camera’s. Of course the argument 
could be made that all films require such a recalibration. Un Chien Andalou is tolerable 
only if one sees it with dada eyes. Brakhage’s rough and painted films require some other 
visual adaptation. But Koyaanisqatsi is a little different because it makes boredom 
revelatory. Passing through boredom, feeling it and then troubleshooting it marks a 
movement into what I will call nonhuman vision. As we come to accept the slow and 
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impassive camera, we begin to see the desert unnaturally—in such a way that we would 
not see it with our eyes alone. Rudolph Arnheim’s explicit suggestion for understanding 
or engaging with a film is for a viewer to “abandon himself to a mental attitude which is 
to some extent unnatural” (43). As a point of clarification, writers such as Donna 
Haraway and Bruno Latour have persuasively dismantled the barriers that set our 
understandings of “nature” apart from “culture”, and I do not intend to imply that there is 
some abstract or ableist “natural” vision.  
I use “unnatural” here in order to carry Arnheim’s idiom into this Posthuman 
discussion, to register Reggio’s cold and mechanical camera, and to demonstrate that 
Koyaanisqatsi, its editing, and its camerawork disrupt the naked eye’s “natural” view of 
the world. The sense of this kind of language, if dubious now, is actually in keeping with 
the spirit of Arnheim’s original argument that when we watch a film, we want to see 
something we would not see in our everyday life—something unreal (in a sense, 
unnatural.) Arnheim locates the power of this idea in two iconic film defamiliarizations. 
Arnheim’s first example is of a train rushing toward the camera, a reference to the 
Lumières’ famous “L’arrivée d’un train en la gare de La Ciotat”: “The nearer the engine 
comes the larger it appears, the dark mass on the screen spreads in every direction at a 
tremendous pace” (61) until it appears far larger than its actual, “real”, off-screen size. 
Arnheim’s second example of how reduced depth creates “unnatural” cinematic views in 
order to create an effect is of the monks in Carl Th. Dreyer’s The Passion of Joan of Arc, 
leaping toward the camera to make them seem all-the-more imposing for both the viewer 
and Joan. The temperament of Arnheim’s ideas, which are rooted in the idea that the 
cinema admirably distorts what it images, rescues the “unnatural” mental attitude and 
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vision I’m describing from accusations of ableism or of ignoring the breaking down of 
the nature-culture divide.   
As Koyaanisqatsi leaves behind the vast expanses of desert and sky and begins to 
study urban spaces, the film’s images continue to achieve the effect Arnheim describes 
but in new ways—perhaps most obviously through time-lapse, which pervades the scenes 
that come after the opening desert scenes. Through time-lapse, clouds and oceans come 
to resemble one another by virtue of the shape and rhythms of their movement. These 
shapes and rhythms are, of course, inaccessible to the human eye alone, off-screen. We 
see clouds and oceans move, but never in the ways that they do in Koyaanisqatsi. The 
images are manipulated and wholly “unnatural” in the sense that seeing what 
Koyaanisqatsi offers requires a camera and some trickery (editing.) What I want to 
highlight here is that Arnheim describes the results of “unnatural” or more-than-real 
images as “true observation.” Counter-intuitively—especially within a documentary 
context—images acquire a certain truth for Arnheim when they do not exactly resemble 
reality. Koyaanisqatsi offers a concrete example of this paradox as the film calls such 
marked attention to its unnatural presentation of familiar subjects. This, I think, 
approaches something crucial for the scholarship that has come to be called 
Posthumanism: because these images are inaccessible to the naked human eye, the 
machine that makes them accessible (cinema) disrupts the default settings of human 
experience, and this disruption is revelatory.   
The question, then, is what Koyaanisqatsi reveals along these lines. Ironically, it’s 
during the film’s middle and latter sections, where the City and its human inhabitants 
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come to the fore, that the film most clearly disrupts the default settings of human 
experience in order to reveal a few of its sad truths. 
Although the film merits no more than a footnote in his book, Green Screen: 
Environmentalism and Hollywood Cinema, David Ingram sums up perhaps the most 
expected or conventional Ecocritical response to Koyaanisqatsi: “[Reggio]…combines in 
a non-narrative mode the cult of pristine, ‘empty’ natural landscapes, and their 
representation as a spectacle of different speeds, as well as the cult of the ecological 
Indian living, unlike urban dwellers, in ‘balance’ with nature” (189). The context in 
which this note arises has to do with tracking shots that render “nature as movement” 
(30) and this idea begins to approach another popular ecological interpretation of 
Reggio’s film. Scott MacDonald, for example, sees Koyaanisqatsi as part of the “city 
symphony” film tradition dating back at least to Berlin: Symphony of a Big City (1927). 
As a city symphony film, MacDonald argues, Koyaanisqatsi “[depicts] urban spaces as 
parts of a broader survey of human experience…the representative day in the life of a city 
[is] merely a cell within larger cinematic organisms” (209). These two popular responses 
to Koyaanisqatsi are both valuable in their own right, but “cinema can do even more: it 
can in fact, embody the logic of the ‘mechanism’ in which we are caught up” (Casetti 
85). And it is in this context that I want to explore what Koyaanisqatsi achieves 
ecologically; Reggio’s film cinematically configures important questions about the 
environment from the literal point of view of a machine.     
As Koyaanisqatsi transitions from being fixated on landscape to entering into 
urban spaces, the intrusion of machinery, construction, and traffic initially comes as a 
shock. The arresting images of human activity might initially suggest that the film 
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maintains a natural-cultural divide by emphasizing the tranquility and stillness of the 
desert in stark contrast to the hustle and bustle of the city. I would argue, however, that 
Koyaanisqatsi is more complicated than that, given the ideas within Arnheim’s film 
theory that emphasize the fairly rudimentary idea that an image’s form is no less 
important than its content. And while Koyaanisqatsi’s content shifts dramatically, its 
form does not. The unnatural vision produced by time-lapse remains consistent regardless 
of what fixes the camera’s attention. In the film’s second half, foot and car traffic are 
presented to viewers no differently than the movement of ocean or clouds. 
Koyaanisqatsi’s form is not interested in a rift between the natural and the cultural. The 
utter stillness of the camera as it stares at people on a Las Vegas sidewalk, and at 
nighttime traffic is perhaps as unnerving and captivating as the desert scenes are 
meditative and boring. In a particularly striking sequence, the camera accommodates both 
the activity within the office building and the peregrination of the moon, without giving 
preference to either.  
Before this arrangement begins to sound too harmonious, it’s important to recall 
the meaning of the film’s title. As the film’s final images explain, Koyaanisqatsi is the 
Hopi word that translates to “crazy life; life out of balance; life in turmoil; life 
disintegrating; a state of life that calls for another way of living.” Film scholars have 
often attributed an ecological message to the film’s title, reinforced by the film’s images 
of human tampering with the environment that borders on hubris. The film’s title, 
however, acquires new significance if one considers the film’s disruption of default 
human vision: in complete accordance with the ecological register, life out of balance 
also comes too mean life too human, an imbalance that Koyaanisqatsi works to correct 
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through its form. In nearly every frame where humans appear, they move only in the 
most regimented, habitual, and even controlled ways. Koyaanisqatsi’s form makes 
ordinary patterns of human behavior look mechanical by imaging them through 
nonhuman vision. As Arnheim instructs, an unnatural presentation of familiar objects 
permits “true observation” of the objects themselves. If we were actually walking around 
times square, driving Los Angeles’ freeways, or turning out the lights of our office, we 
probably would not observe the rigid and mechanical patterns of behavior that we 
experience on-screen, through Koyaanisqatsi’s nonhuman eyes. This experience, 
informed by Arnheim, anachronistically answers Cary Wolfe’s challenge to rethink and 
recontextualize the visual modalities that belong to the domain of the human. Wolfe’s 
sense of the posthuman entails a disruption of the ways in which ordinary sensory 
experience yields an understanding of the world marked by habituation (habituation 
being a point I’ll return to later in this chapter.) Discussing the bizarre and somewhat 
alarming work of biocybernetic artist Eduardo Kac, Wolfe admires the way GFP Bunny 
“appeals to specifically human visual habits and conventions for the purposes of making 
the point that the visual as we traditionally think of it can precisely no longer be indexed 
to those conventions and habits at all” (164). In the same spirit, Koyaanisqatsi slows 
down the visual perception process in its first thirty minutes, calling viewers’ attention to 
their own visual habits and announcing that visual perception will be indexed differently, 
beyond their habits, for the duration of the film; experiencing Koyaanisqatsi’s first thirty 
minutes as anything other than boring requires viewers to abandon their “taken-for-
granted mode of human experience” (Wolfe xxv). The constantly dwindling time 
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between cuts in an average Hollywood film, by contrast, encourages the Humanist 
impulse to be initially bored by Koyaanisqatsi. 
Working with some of Sergei Eisenstein’s famous film theory in my first chapter, 
I highlighted the idea that the cinematic shot is a kind of biological cell and that montage 
is the organism that grows out of that cellular division. I have resisted here the urge to 
specify—and I hope the word species or speciation echoes in this word—the kind of 
vision human spectators experience when they see Koyaanisqatsi. At any given moment 
in the film, the camera eye might behave like a bird, scanning the ground and the water’s 
surface for a meal, or a dog out for a walk in the city, its eye-level just above the average 
human knee. But the camera can also be impassive, impartial, and mechanical. The film 
can simultaneously feel like the alien vision of a machine. This discrepancy between 
living and non-living, natural and cultural, and animal and inanimate grows into a 
cinematic experience in Koyaanisqatsi that taps into a fundamental principle of 
Posthumanism, that the terms of these binaries are not neatly boxed off from one another, 
and that as Cary Wolfe’s work argues, the deconstruction of these binaries offers us 
humans a chance to expand the range of our sensory experience. This expansion is 
desperately needed according to the film’s logic, as its camera displays humans activity 
so bleakly. The nonhuman form “forces us to rethink our taken-for-granted modes of 
human experience” (Wolfe xxv) in order to correct the imbalance, insanity, and turmoil 
of human life that seems so controlled and simultaneously so destructive.  
This is why we need a posthuman and ecological film theory. As our taken-for-
granted human activity propels our world down the path of so-called “advances” in 
biotechnologies and energy production—and of course it must be said that capital is the 
! 41 
fuel for this journey—we need posthuman and ecological critiques that register with all 
the impact and affect of a great film. If film theory is about articulating what cinema does 
and of what it is capable, and if film theory fosters new, “unnatural” visual experiences, 
then a general theory of what cinema is capable of vis-à-vis is exactly what is needed to 
expand the possibilities for “expand[ing] environmental perception, understanding, and 
consciousness” (Ivakhiv 2). 
 
3.3. A Belabored World 
Once, cinema celebrated the vivacious outpouring of “Workers Leaving the 
Factory.” The Lumière brothers famous film, according to Sean Cubitt’s rhapsodic 
description, set cinema (whether documentary or fictional) onto a course of leisure, 
imbuing the cinema with a radically non-productive origin:  
[It] is significant that, unlike Marey’s chronophotography, the Lumière 
cinematograph was not turned immediately to anthropometric time and motion 
studies, aimed at optimal mechanization of gesture in the factory, but to leisure, to 
the immediately accessible utopia of time off…[To] have placed at the instigation 
of cinema’s dialectic of difference and repetition not a story but an event that is at 
once an end—of work—and a beginning—of leisure—neither of which is visible 
and neither of which is composable as an equilibrium. In place of closure, we 
have only commotion, a document not of truth but of the space between truths. 
(Cubitt 20-2) 
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 Cinema begins, in other words, when work stops. And for Cubitt, the documentary 
quality of the Lumières’ film lies between the opposed activities of work and leisure, 
showing neither, but simultaneously conveying both. Koyaanisqatsi tragically repeats and 
updates the effects Cubitt sees and celebrates in the Lumieres’ famous film. But whereas 
Cubitt sees in “Workers Leaving the Factory” a utopic potential for cinema’s future, I see 
in Koyaanisqatsi an unhappy warning.  
Unlike the Lumières, Reggio documents not workers leaving the workplace, but 
shift changes. Koyaanisqatsi evacuates all sense of leisure and down-time, in exchange 
for constant business and occupation. Workers in Koyaanisqatsi do not seem to have time 
off, but to simply toggle from on or off (-duty) positions. But unlike the idiosyncratic and 
chaotic movements of the workers in the Lumières’ film, Reggio’s subjects move in a 
kind of controlled hysteria. The speed of the image showing people fleeing into and out 
of the Lockheed building suggests exactly zero leisure. The hurry to begin work appears 
to be mirrored by the panic to leave it. And so in addition to the ecological, and 
posthuman significances of the film’s title, Koyaanisqatsi puts on screen a life temporally 
out of balance where the work-leisure rhythms of modern life have ceased to alternate. 









Night does not have any bearing upon the stoppage of work. One famous 
sequence of the film displays the continuous flow of lights and traffic for a twenty-four 
hour period, and Koyaanisqatsi features many scenes of the city at night. One montage in 
particular moves from a busy and illuminated city-scape to a single man working the 
night-shift in an anonymous control room of some kind. On-the-clock, but thoroughly 
unengaged in any kind of labor, the man sits on-duty with not apparent duties to carry 
out. He slumps backward in a chair idly smoking a cigarette—an object that often 
suggests leisure in films, but here subsumed by work. The man’s haggard face seems to 
contemplate his own isolation from the world as he awaits either actual work to do, or the 
end of his shift. The message here is not that work in the modern world allows for leisure, 
the point is that one cannot differentiate between the two; day and night present no 
meaningful distinction for the hustle and bustle within an office building, the flow of 







Elsewhere, even when its images do not explicitly recall “Workers Leaving the 
Factory,” Koyaanisqatsi evacuates leisure from the cinematic experience. The scenes at 
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the beginning of the film show us deserts and rivers bereft of campers and swimmers. We 
see thousands of cars and pedestrians, but no one seems to be travelling, everyone is busy 
getting to where they need to be. Even when Reggio’s camera fixes a crowded beach in 
Southern California, the ominous presence of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 
lurking all-too-close to surfers and sunbathers forbids viewers from sharing in the 
relaxation enjoyed by the people on-screen. The image becomes a kind of dramatic irony, 
or a transformation of the “Look out! He’s right behind you!” shot from a horror film. 
We see people playing arcade games and dancing, but the time-lapse only suggests a 
joyless, mechanical engagement with the things we call entertainment, but which should 
allow access to leisure. 
What are these sequences concerning labor, which half-mockingly reprises the 
Lumière brothers’ “Workers Leaving the Factory” doing in a film about the modern 
Western world’s relationship to the planet? It is no coincidence that one of the film’s 
sequences showing a midday shift-change occurs at a Lockheed facility. The 
manufacturer of many military aircraft, Lockheed’s very existence signifies the 





Just seven years before Koyaanisqatsi’s release, Lockheed was at the center of a massive 
bribery scandal that entailed paying massive sums of money to various governments to 
guarantee contracts for producing military aircraft. A Los Angeles Times article marking 
the death of Lockheed’s former president, A. Carl Kotchian, calls Kotchian “a key figure 
in what became one of the biggest bribery scandals ever” (Pae “Ex-Lockheed Chief…”).  
The collapse of military and civilian spheres certainly does not begin with 
Lockheed. But Koyaanisqatsi registers this collapse in several ways. Certainly the film 
encourages viewers to consider what in means for Lockheed’s presence to be included in 
the film (in much the same way the film ironically includes a Kentucky Fried Chicken ad 
encouraging patrons to “Have a Barrel of Fun.”) Part of Lockheed’s significance within 
the film is to put the questions of labor and cultural militarization into the context of how 
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we interact with and relate to the environment. And this combination does not bode well 
for the future of the environment. 
Paul Virilio’s book Popular Defense & Ecological Struggles takes up this very 
question of ecology within the context of a militarized society. Beginning with historical 
examples of the erosion of distinct military and civilian spheres, citing specifically the 
creation of “the army as social class” (12), Virilio argues that “from the beginning, 
military intelligence has struggled against…the chaos of the natural environment and the 
spontaneous movements that can occur within it” (14). Not only does Virilio’s analysis 
align ecology with spontaneity, one could also read in it an implicit alignment of 
militarization with habituation, and this casts a particularly concerning light upon the 
habits associated with vision Cary Wolfe challenges Posthumanism to confront. The 
humanist vision Wolfe wants to disrupt is simultaneously a militarized vision is Virilio’s 
idiom. The implications here for understanding and responding to the complexity of 
Koyaanisqatsi are that we must see the utterly mechanical behavior of human activity in 
the film as a graph or index of the population’s militarization. Of course this 
understanding is underscored by particular sequences of the film where empty apartment 
buildings are bombed as though they were on a battlefield, and where a cut from cars to 
tanks suggests a kind of militarized driver and vehicle. But even where the connection is 
not so obvious, we must recognize the intrusion of military priorities into the behavior of 
civilians. 
The movement of militarization away from spontaneity (which Virilio aligns with 
ecology) and toward predictable control marks nearly every image of human populations 
in Koyaanisqatsi. Flatly rejecting the American mythos surrounding the automobile as 
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access to particular kinds of freedom, cars in Koyaanisqatsi are unfailingly under control. 
Indeed what is shocking about the volume of traffic we see in Koyaanisqatsi is that we 
never see a collision or hiccup in the unrelenting flow of cars. I do not mean to suggest 
that a car crash is a viable answer to the question of where Koyaanisqatsi locates 
liberation. What I want to suggest is that the uniformity of automotive behavior is an 








Human behavior in Koyaanisqatsi always demonstrates a military impulse toward 
predictable control and obedience that stems from a becoming-machine of the human 
itself. Virilio specifies the relationship between mechanization and militarization as: “The 
dialectic of war, delivered from passivity, demands of the military engineer an increased 
effort in the technical domain, an effort centered on the suppression or replacement of 
the human factor in the machine’s overall workings” (28-9). And so Virilio’s comments 
show that as humans increasingly come to resemble machines—as they do throughout 
Koyaanisqatsi—they become increasingly militarized. For Virilio, then, the military and 
the environment comprise two opposed impulses marked by mechanization on the one 
side, and by spontaneity on the other.  
Although the implications of this arrangement might seem to result in a facile 
“back to nature” ethos, Koyaanisqatsi complicates the picture by implicating the absence 
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of leisure as part-and parcel of a culture accelerating toward mechanical militarization. 
Failing to recognize the complexity of Koyaanisqatsi’s call for a life balanced by the 
natural world is a disservice to the intensity of the film and the range of its images. And 
although it is not my central concern here, the problem of Capitalism is, undoubtedly, in 
play as well. Pietari Kääpä’s chapter “Transnational Approaches to Ecocinema: Charting 
an Expansive Field” in the book Transnational Ecocinema directly addresses 
Koyaanisqatsi’s anti-capitalist ecology. The film’s shift from expansive desert, cloud, 
and aquatic images toward the business of traffic and urban images is in fact introduced 
by work. More specifically, the film introduces work and humans simultaneously in the 
process of exploiting the desert’s ecosystems for coal-fired energy. (Glen Canyon Dam, 
incidentally, features prominently in one scene of Koyaanisqatsi and is an important 
fixture of the recent documentary Dam Nation (dir. Ben Knight and Travis Rummel, 
2014) which explains why the dam was built and the ways in which the energy it 
produces and the revenue it generates fuel even more ecologically damaging projects.)   
Koyaanisqatsi is a film that has radicalized the idea (however unstable or 
misguided from a Deleuzian or Derridean point of view) that art is a mirror held up to 
reality. The film embraces this task in several ways, but perhaps the two most obvious 
ways are the significance of the title, meaning “life out of balance”, which encourages 
viewers to use the film to help pinpoint a few of the problems with modern urban life, 
and Koyaanisqatsi also courts the status and power of the mirror in the curiously repeated 
sequences of people staring into Reggio’s camera. Often the people’s faces are impassive 
and inscrutable. Some peoples’ eyes dance sporadically away from the camera, as though 
the intensity of the moment, the stare down, is too much for them to handle. But one 
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particularly curious moment witnesses a man shaving on a crowded public sidewalk. This 
marvelous moment literalizes and metaphor that art is a mirror of the world. Reggio’s 
camera is like one-way glass where viewers can see through to the other side, but the 
film’s subjects see only their reflection.      
 
Figure 3.10 
The image of this old man shaving in front of Reggio’s camera is not only an invitation to 
see the film as a reflection of the world on the other side of the lens, it also raises an 
important question about the camera’s place within the world it films. And it is in 
precisely this context that despite its sobering and frightening images of lockstep, 
mechanical behavior where there seems to be no leisure time for off-the-clock activities, 
Koyaanisqatsi does manage to show us spontaneity. In this sense, Koyaanisqatsi is a 
literal imaging of Francesco Casetti’s statement that “The cinema succeeds in laying bare 
the subtle logic at the foundation of the ‘mechanism’ of the modern world…On the 
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screen…we see what we have become” (85). (Even if this mechanical becoming arrives 
on screen a couple of decades in advance of the cinematic nadir of drone films.)   
In several sequences of Koyaanisqatsi, passersby lock eyes with, and respond to 
Reggio’s camera. Their responses often register surprise, puzzlement or discomfort. 
Cinema actually intrudes into the world it documents as a disruption to mechanical 
predictability. The presence of a camera is met with the knowing smirk of a woman who 
looks like she’s sharing a private joke with those of us on the other side of Reggio’s lens.  
  
Figure 3.11 
Even suspicion of the camera, such as we find the expression of a man walking 
alone on the sidewalk, qualifies as an admirable and spontaneous response to cinema’s 
intrusion into his world. The man’s slightly raised right eyebrow, though furrowed in the 
middle, and the inclination of his head, tilted to continue his examination of the 
documentarian, seem not to trust the camera. Could we imagine such suspicion among 
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anyone among the throngs of people riding the escalators? And has our present relation to 
cameras become so accustomed to the omnipresence of cameras and so “Inured to 
endless closed circuit TV, we have lost the shock that ought to greet” (Cubitt 16) a 
stranger filming us?  
 
Figure 3.12 
To my mind, suspicion of cameras—much as I love them—has perhaps become a radical 
response that registers their power and that simultaneously flies in the face of the 
passivity toward cameras the marks not only the mechanical behaviors Koyaanisqatsi 
brings to bear, but also the uncritical neutrality that allows our current culture to have 
become so accustomed to cameras that we hardly notice them or what they do. Reggio’s 
time-lapse editing cannot shoulder all of the blame here. Earlier in the film we see many 
people sitting in traffic on Los Angeles’ freeways—in slow-motion nonetheless—and no 
one seems to feel much of anything, let alone something like suspicion. Only when the 
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camera becomes something that interacts with the world do we see anything like 
spontaneity in Koyaanisqatsi.  
Another memorable scene where bystanders engage the camera occurs on the Las 
Vegas strip where six cocktail waitresses hold the camera’s gaze. Some of the women 
fidget, some have to occasionally look away, and the woman furthest left is fighting back 
a smile the whole time. The camera produces discomfort perhaps because it interrupts 
work. The women are all dressed in their work uniforms, and without tasks to carry out, 
the camera’s presence creates an interval of time resembling leisure. But the women do 




Perhaps the most simple example of the camera’s presence introducing 
spontaneity into the world of the film is when a man walking in Times Square—which 
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even in 1983 hosts countless distractions to the eye—actually turns around to get a 
second look at the camera; it is as though for this man cinema’s intrusion into the world 
completely disrupts the routine and predictable scene of mechanically single-minded 




What is remarkable about Reggio’s film, however, is not just its implicit commentary on 
what Western capitalist society has become—namely a world defined by mechanical 
traffic of all kinds whether automotive, pedestrian, or economic, where neither leaving 
the workplace nor the nighttime hours after most peoples’ workdays have finished, ushers 
in a time of leisure. What makes this critique truly radical is that Reggio places it within 
the contexts of the environment and the process of militarization.  
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 One of the most striking cuts in Koyaanisqatsi is an aerial tracking shot 
displaying row upon row of cars. Although the cars are multi-colored, this image alone 
confronts viewers with a glimpse of mass-produced anonymity underlying the myth of 
the car-as-individual-freedom. But Reggio cuts from this image to stock footage of an 
arsenal of tanks, and the cultural critique becomes much more complex. The montage 
suggests that we ought to be more suspicious of car culture, not because of how much 
cars come to resemble one another, but because of the much more frightening revelation 
that they resemble tanks. The implication of this critique is that as urban society 
increasingly casts people as faceless cogs in the city’s machinery, they come to resemble 
soldiers: simply put, Koyaanisqatsi traces our culture’s uniformity along the lines of 
militarization. 
 
3.4. Drone Films and YOU 
One crucial difference between Koyaanisqatsi and the drone footage that 
circulates online, stems from a basic lesson from Althusser which he calls the recognition 
function of ideology. An encounter with ideology strikes us with a certain amount of 
“obviousness” that seems to require no investigation; when we are confronted with a 
dominant ideology, we respond by “crying out (aloud or in the ‘still, small voice of 
conscience’): ‘That’s obvious! That’s right! That’s true!’” (46). The recognition function 
lies precisely in the rush to obvious consensus which falsely reassures subjects that there 
is no need for further questioning or investigation: “the ‘obviousness’ that you and I are 
subjects—and that that does not cause any problems—is an ideological effect” (46). The 
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preclusion of questioning is why ideology is in fact at its most nefarious when it pretends 
to be non-ideological. Althusser succinctly warns readers that “what thus seems to take 
place outside ideology (to be precise, in the street), in reality takes place in ideology” 
(49). Drone footage of Chernobyl or of dolphins at Dana Point wants very badly not to 
confront viewers with any ideological questions. The comment from Althusser about 
ideology moving around “in the street”, incidentally, lends the problem of the recognition 
function a particularly documentary significance. And so the impassive, disinterested, 
and mostly unedited drone documentary films are exactly where we ought to be most 
concerned about the ideology they purvey. 
Viewers of “Drones in Pripyat (Chernobyl)” are meant to enjoy the eerie stillness 
and dilapidation of Chernobyl without having to confront any hard questions about why 
they allow themselves to be romanced by graceful images of destruction—or even 
questions about nuclear energy or species depopulation. (Still less are viewers meant to 
see the site of the Chernobyl meltdown through drone footage as a mass grave.) And the 
popular dolphin video is about enjoying the surprising numbers of dolphins in the frame, 
their spontaneous emergence from beneath the Pacific’s surface, and it is also about 





This last point about the camera’s movements producing a particular kind of enjoyment 
is, of course, is a very old and perhaps not very novel concept. The iconic sequences 
featuring The Overlook’s hotels hallways in The Shining are only possible because of the 
Steadicam’s technological advancements, allowing Kubrick to uninterruptedly film 
around corners. Going even further back, F.W. Murnau’s The Last Laugh is one of the 
very first films to use the “Entfesselte Kamera” technique, allowing the camera to move 
at all while filming. The “unchained camera” creates all kinds of shots which we take for 
granted today (the tilt, pan, tracking, etc.) But the consequences of drone technology do 
very little to advance cinema, and in some sense actually destroy it. 
 Drone films rely upon two distinct characteristics for their visual enjoyment: first, 
they attempt to create a sense of weightlessness or flight simulation in their images. 
Second, drone films re-present familiar spaces or objects to us in what Arnheim calls an 
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“unnatural” way. But whereas Koyaanisqatsi also relies upon these two mannerisms for 
its visual enjoyment and impact, drone films almost never display any principles of 
editing. In fact, drone films seem to seek an end to editing. 
 In the example of the “Drones Over Dolphin Stampede and Whales off Dana 
Point and Maui” video, the drone is the star of the film. To some degree, the film could 
be recording anything, and the attraction would still be the drone. Of course it is pleasant 
to look at the dolphins breaking the surface of the water, but viewers are not invited to 
remark their athleticism, their gracefulness, or even (more simply) the animals’ beauty. 
What we are invited, instead, to appreciate is the vista afforded by the drone which 
dolphins happen to enter, or complement. Rather than interrupt this view with cuts, 
montage, etc. drone films merely survey what they record. They do not invite what 
Arnheim calls “true observation” in the way that Koyaanisqatsi does. In this capacity, the 
drone is essentially a tool of surveillance, not cinema.  
What makes the drone film different from other kinds of popular film 
entertainment is its dismissal of editing. Eisenstein once located “the essence of cinema 
not in the shots but in the relationship between the shots” (69)—or in other words, in 
editing. Even the most conventional and uninspired Hollywood action picture abides 
Eisenstein’s proclamation as the intensity of action sequences often results from the 
rapidity and rhythm of cuts. Perhaps it is unfair to measure drone films against 
Eisenstein’s standards; one could argue for their cinematic merit as a technological 
innovation of the long take. However, drone films also disappoint the ideas of André 
Bazin, champion of the long take as an improvement on montage. Bazin argues that the 
technical requirements for filming long takes with a large depth of field (he cites Wyler 
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and Welles as models) “affects the relationships of the minds of spectators to the image, 
and in consequence it influences the interpretation of the spectacle” (Bazin 35). These 
results, however, seem to be more lofty than what we can expect from a drone film, 
where viewers’ attention inevitably gets turned back onto the drone itself. In other words, 
the advent of depth of field and the long take in the 1940’s allowed viewers access to new 
ways to experience motion pictures; drones on the other hand allow viewers only access 
to new applications of drones.        
Koyaanisqatsi actually uses its own editing principles of montage to proleptically 
warn viewers about the kind of images produced by cameras attached to drones. Near the 
very end of the film, Reggio’s camera mimics the kind of aerial shot that has become a 
signature of drone footage to survey an urban landscape. Because of a stunning cut, the 










It is not by coincidence that Reggio chooses Detroit as the initial urban landscape at the 
start of this sequence. The easily recognizable headquarters of General Motors is a kind 
of synecdoche for the city itself. Because of economic hardship, Detroit already looks as 
though it has been bombed. (Recall that earlier in the film, there are several scenes of 
Detroit’s abandoned and skeletal buildings.) Reggio then cuts from Detroit to an 
anonymous thermal image of a city from the same height, cutting from a drone-like view 
of the city to a military one, although the visual similarities between the two are 








This linkage, the urban-military-machine, marked by the elimination of leisure and 
spontaneity serves as a warning about the nature of drone films. This warning is possible 
only through Reggio’s editing decisions, where the montage beginning with an overhead 
view of Detroit divides and develops into an image of a computer’s guts. I would argue 
that recognizing and reflecting on this warning is totally in keeping with the kind of “true 
observation” Arnheim describes as a by-product of cinema’s capacity to induce 
“unnatural” vision. Although Arnheim’s writing rests within a humanist context, I read 
this concept as perhaps a kind of proto-posthuman idea without interchanging one-to-one 
the terms “unnatural” and “posthuman.” Koyaanisqatsi, in any case, ascribes a 
posthuman valance or significance to the concept Arnheim articulates.  
 The shared characteristics between drones and military surveillance are 
accentuated further by contrasting drones with the sequences in which Reggio’s camera 
! 65 
interacts with its subjects. Drones do not interact with their environment.  and so cannot 
achieve the kind of spontaneous exchanges and interactions I mention above, which Paul 
Virilio characterizes as a fundamental connection humans have with the ecological.  
 A horrifying report from 60 Minutes from August, 2009 titled “Drones: America’s 
New Air Force” emphasizes the US military’s predator drones’ undetectable presence: as 
she searches the sky, correspondant Lara Logan explains “Even though I know there’s a 
Predator over head, I still can’t hear a thing. Pretty much like an insurgent on the ground 
in Afghanistan, or in Iraq. And if you look up, to the exact spot we’re told the Predator is 
flying right now, there’s nothing but clouds and blue sky.” Logan also details just how 
efficiently lethal drones are. She seems to almost admire the massive bomb affixed to the 
drone, “but the most important weapon,” Logan claims, “is the aircraft’s million-dollar 
camera.” As a military instrument, cameras on drones certainly have the capacity to 
envision any and all filmed subjects as military targets. Not only does Logan remark how 
similar she is to an “insurgent” in the quotation above, the report also demonstrates the 
drone film’s inclination to see any space as a battlefield: “This barren, mountainous 
landscape may look like Afghanistan, but in fact it’s just forty-five miles north of the Las 
Vegas strip on the edge of the Mojave desert.” At one point, Lieutenant Colonel Chris 
Gough confronts the question of how “engaged” military personnel are with combat if 
they are operating a drone from thousands of miles away from the actual battlefield with 
the following statement: “There are arguments that we aren't as engaged in the war. I've 
heard those arguments. And I can tell you that - and I'm happy to tell ya - that I've never 
been more engaged in a conflict in my life.” But this response acquires frightening and 
sinister implications when one considers the ways in which drone cameras have the 
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capacity to ignore the distinction between civilian and soldier, combat zone and national 
park, news reporter and insurgent.  (“Drones: America’s New Air Force”). We may not 
have as-yet incorporated drones into our daily, civilian lives, but all signs point to their 
proliferation. But, regardless of what will become their stated use or purpose, we have 
already carved out a predatory and military role for drones’ future—the best-known 
drone is, afterall, named the Predator. 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
Lev Manovich’s comments on the explosion of digital media since the advent of 
the internet argue that “In computer culture, montage is no longer the dominant aesthetic, 
as it was throughout the twentieth century, from the avant-garde of the 1920’s up until the 
postmodernism of the 1980’s. Digital compositing, in which different spaces are 
combined into a single seamless virtual space is a good example of the alternative 
aesthetics of continuity” (144). As I have argued, Koyaanisqatsi invites viewers to 
investigate what the loss of montage means vis-à-vis militarized societies and drone 
footage. Drone films are antithetical to any principle of editing. Drones are about 
surveilling targets and so what was once described as the “arbitrariness” of the 
photographic frame has been replaced with a particular kind of military purpose. A 
second point here is that drone films never feature cuts. They are always a perversion of 
the long-take from a camera whose engagement with the world it films is predatory. 
Another consideration of the quotation from Manovich is the ambiguity of his use of the 
term avant-garde. Does he mean Vertov—who figures as a kind of hero figure for his 
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book? Vertov’s seminal Man with a Movie Camera came out in 1929. Or, does Manovich 
mean the surrealist films of people like Dalí and Buñuel, whose equally seminal Un 
Chien Andalou was also released in 1929? Of course the principles and tactics of 
montage are equally at work in both, and so deciding between the two is something of a 
moot point. But I want to bring surrealism into the discussion here as another kind of 
cinematic history that drones destroy when they replace montage with surveillance. 
Koyaanisqatsi is certainly more intimately related to Vertov’s work and style, but one 
could see Koyaanisqatsi’s insistence on the importance of montage as a kind of 
ambassador for all kinds of film history. 
 Koyaanisqatsi relentlessly challenges viewers to interrogate their inclinations 
toward mechanical and therefore militarized behavior. As the film specifically recalls The 
Lumière Brothers’ seminal “Workers Leaving the Factory” it suggests that this modern 
tendency presents an affront to leisure. For students of film theory, this threat extends to 
the very foundations of cinema itself per Sean Cubitt’s analysis of “Workers Leaving the 
Factory.” And for students of Posthumanism and posthuman thought/philosophy, 
Koyaanisqatsi poses a crucially important question: how does one become posthuman 
without becoming a tool for military manipulation? Of course there are several facets and 
frontiers of posthuman thought, but many of these trajectories are intimately bound up 
with the impulse toward militarization. Biotechnological advancements in prosthetics and 
neuroscience, for example, have been profoundly accelerated as a response to veterans of 
the disastrous imperial war in Iraq. Likewise, the cybernetic face of Posthumanism seems 
to be even more suspect as an avenue toward Posthuman liberation considering Edward 
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Snowden’s alarming revelations of widespread (and illegal) federal surveillance of online 
activity.  
The etymology of “spontaneity”—which Virilio links inextricably to ecology as a 
descriptor of the environment’s behavior—offers an alternative pathway toward 
Posthuman liberation from Humanist discourses that do not work in service of an 
increasingly militarized world. The second entry for “spontaneity” in the OED says that 
the word was once belonged to the realm of “voluntary action or movement on the part of 
animals (or plants.)” Rather than becoming machines, we would do well to think 
seriously about becomings-animal.
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4.1. Introduction and Becoming-Animal 
A popular work of fiction among scholars who work in the field of Animal 
Studies is J.M. Coetzee’s The Lives of Animals. The book’s bold and captivating 
protagonist, Elizabeth Costello, brazenly praises animals’ linguistic quietude: 
“Generation after generation, heroically, our captives refuse to speak to us” (25). The 
question of speech, where animals are concerned has constituted in the history of 
philosophy a fissure along which humans and animals are divided. But rather than enter 
into a debate over the technicalities of whether animals such as dolphins or whales, for 
example, actually do have language, Elizabeth Costello transforms animals’ “lack” of 
speech into a radical protest that does not name what it sees.  
Costello’s words are fascinating first and foremost because they short-circuit an 
anthropocentric impulse to “elevate” animals to the status of humans by demonstrating 
how “like us” they actually are. This impulse manifests itself in many ways—as for 
instance in the basic cable channel Animal Planet’s motto “Surprisingly Human”—but no 
matter the intentions behind it, this impulse is always a disservice to animals themselves 
because the logic that structures this impulse holds that only humanoid beings are worthy 
of ethical or political consideration. (This is a point that Costello herself brings up vis-à-
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vis the question of rights.) But Costello’s declaration that animals “heroically refuse to 
speak” not only refuses an anthropocentric ethic, it also opens a pathway for thinking 
about combatting human-centric responses to art. Although “refuse” here implies that 
animals have language, and simply do not use it, I read Costello’s sentiment as an attempt 
to think animals’ silence in radical, productive, and positive terms. The idea that animals 
have language in the first place might be an anthropocentric attitude, but Costello’s 
admiration for their silence is a slap in the face of the idea that language somehow makes 
humans superior to animals. 
Animals’ refusal to become humanoid through speech strikes me as echoing the 
sensibility of Roland Barthes’s declaration in Camera Lucida that “Such is the 
photograph: it cannot say what it lets us see” (100). Although Barthes language here falls 
back on the question of ability, the photograph’s non-linguistic transmission becomes a 
kind of occasion for Barthes to celebrate photography generally. Akira Mizuta Lippit’s 
book, Electric Animal, concretizes this argument by pointing out that the “contact 
between language and the animal marks a limit of the very function of language. The 
proximity to the threshold of language is a trait common to animals and to another 
medium, photography” (Lippit 163). And although many other writers (including John 
Berger and his famous essay “Why Look at Animals?”) have established a certain 
connection between animals and photography, much remains to be explored about how 
what this connection makes possible, especially with regard to its potential to affect the 
humans who look at and engage with photographs themselves.  
In the case of both the animal and photography, the intriguing silence of each 
offers up an opportunity to engage the world with the senses, sensationally, as opposed to 
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with the mind and the larynx exclusively, and to inherit the responsibility inherent in 
sharing suffering. The refusal to speak bonds animals and photographs in an unlikely 
alliance with one another where neither position is interchangeable, but where they 
complement one another in order to create an opportunity for what Donna Haraway has 
called “sharing suffering” in her book When Species Meet (75-7). This alliance and its 
effects of sharing suffering in turn answer a challenge issued by Derrida in The Animal 
that Therefore I Am to “open the immense question of pathos…of suffering, pity, and 
compassion” (Derrida 26) in ways other than the victimizing images of animal suffering 
circulated by so-called animal rights organizations. The question, then, is what comes to 
be exchanged between human and animal through the mute photograph and how this 
exchange happens. 
The relationship between animals and photographic images has been theorized in 
a number of ways; I am not the first writer to consider their entanglement. Most 
commonly, the shape of this scholarly conversation tends to be ethical. Jonathan Burt’s 
book Animals In Film points out the ways in which for the earliest photographers and 
filmmakers, “[c]apturing animals on film presented technological challenges, which in 
turn reinforced the novelty of film via the animal’s own potential for novelty and its 
power to fascinate…film locates questions of the place of the animal in modernity at the 
junction where technology and issues of the treatment of animals meet” (86-7). And this 
reinforcement becomes explicitly an ethical concern for Nicole Shaukin where her book, 
Animal Capital, indicts film and photography where as early as Muybridge and the 
Chicago World’s Fair, “a kino-eye can nevertheless already be glimpsed working 
alongside animal disassembly and reconstituting it as a moving image…the rise of 
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cinematic culture was also literally—materially contingent on mass slaughter” due to its 
reliance upon gelatins for photo-chemical development (103). And yet for all the disgust 
and outrage of Shukin’s book, she never pauses to actually look at the things she rails 
against—films and photographs. (Even as she tosses in the term kino-eye, she mentions 
Dziga Vertov only second-hand.) And looking is undeniably important. Not only because 
looking is the sensory arena where we come to meet photography, but also because as 
Lippit argues, “Animals can be seen as predecessors of photography, the two joined by 
the ecstatic feature of their look” (Lippit 183). Lippit’s phrasing here is both intriguing 
and ambiguous. I take “ecstatic feature of their look” as an encapsulation of the ways in 
which both photography and animals each have the capacity to call attention to the 
delight of vision itself. Even images of sadness or pain sensitize viewers to the power of 
vision. Each time I see, for example, Nick Ut’s photograph of Kim Phúc running naked 
from a cloud of Napalm, of course I experience shock and sadness as a response to the 
image, but I also register the way in which vision is the vehicle by which I approach these 
responses. Regardless of the image one beholds, there is indeed a kind of “ecstasy” in 
vision’s capacity to affect so instantly and so intensely. 
The history Shaukin traces never treats an image as something to look at, or given 
the syntax of Lippit’s idea, to look with. In Shaukin’s analysis, photographs (or perhaps 
any image) is always and only a commodity. Her argument that the assembly (and 
disassembly) line associated with “Fordism” accounts for the rise of film culture at least 
in part depends upon the misguided idea that images are merely and only commodities to 
consume. And while I respect her attempt to think through the relationship between 
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animals and photos through a kind of Marxist materialism, her work leaves many 
important conversations unexplored.   
 The question of looking must be addressed, included, and enmeshed into the 
ethical concerns raised by the majority of scholarship on animals and film in order to 
honor both the art of film and photography and the importance of their theorizations. In 
John Berger’s famous essay, “Why Look at Animals”, which is not only about 
photography, but animals and visual culture broadly, Berger argues that the Nineteenth 
Century’s invention of the zoo, where “people go to meet animals, to observe them, to 
see them, is, in fact, a monument to the impossibility of such encounters. Modern zoos 
are an epitaph to a relationship which was as old as man” (21). Looking at animals in 
zoos “even if the animal is up against the bars less than a foot from you, looking 
outwards in the public direction, you are looking at something that has been rendered 
absolutely marginal” (24). And so there is a serious ethical question to consider here: 
what violence allows me to see? For zoos (not exclusively, but certainly emblematically) 
the answer is fairly straightforward. Marginalization supplants relationship and prevents 
any kind of encounter with animals that is not structured by domination. But what about 
images of animals? Discussing photography, Berger writes, “owls or giraffes, the camera 
fixes them in a domain which, although entirely visible to the camera, will never be 
entered by the spectator. All animals appear like fish seen through the plate glass of an 
aquarium” (16). 
The problem Berger’s analysis poses, then, is how to look at animals in such a 
way that resists the violence of looking that marks the zoo experience. The task is to 
create a visual link between humans and animals that answers Derrida’s challenge to 
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“open the immense question of pathos…of suffering, pity, and compassion” productively, 
in such a way that actually bridges the chasm between human and animal effected by 
zoos. This is a challenge rarely taken up by ecocinematic scholars. Jennifer Ladino’s 
essay, for example, “Working With Animals: Regarding Companion Species in 
Documentary Film” clearly recognizes how important is the question of looking, raised 
by John Berger. Ladino states that “ [she is] inspired by not only by the rich body of 
scholarship on looking at animals by John Berger, Derek Bousé, Cynthia Chris, and 
others but also by Laura Mulvey’s classic essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ 
which prompted me to think about nonhuman animals as the ‘to-be-looked-at’ objects of 
the camera’s ‘speciesed’ gaze” (130). There is a distinct problem with this kind of 
approach. Despite her skepticism toward what she calls a “speciesist camera [that] sees 
animals through human eyes” (130), she ends up doing little more than inducting animals 
into a theoretical discourse that is fundamentally human. Being “inspired” by Mulvey’s 
essay, and the identity politics it perpetuates, means writing about animals as though they 
were marginalized humans.  
And so limiting a critical response to the representation of animals cannot 
approach animals from anything other than an anthropocentric point of view. Not only 
does this kind of approach fail to meet Derrida’s challenges in The Animal that Therefore 
I Am, it also has to qualify—by Ladino’s own terms—as speciesist. And so rather than 
focus on representation, a better approach might concern itself with transformation. 
Transformation and metamorphosis are integral to a lot of the collaborative work by 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and their concept of becoming-animal, as outlined 
most vividly and extensively in their magnum opus A Thousand Plateaus offers 
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ecocinematic writing one possible pathway for transformative encounter that does not 
consider animals as marginalized humans. Instead, becoming-animal allows animals to 
transform the writing and thought of the human: “[t]here are animal becomings in 
literature which do not consist in talking of one’s dog or cat. It is rather an encounter 
between two reigns, a short-circuit, the picking-up of a code where each is 
deterritorialized. In writing one always gives writing to those who do not have it, but the 
latter give writing a becoming without which it would not exist” (Deleuze and Parnet 44). 
I am not certain about the idea that writing always gives writing to those who do not have 
it, but even if that is true, I am suspicious of the way I which the idea quickly resorts to a 
conception of writing as nothing more than (or nothing more transformative than) 
advocacy. And the stakes are fairly high where animals are concerned because since 
animals do not have language to begin with, speaking for animals maneuvers animals into 
humanist attitudes about language as a prerequisite for rights. Deleuze and Guattari 
actually modify this sentiment in What Is Philosophy by making a crucial distinction 
between speaking for and speaking before another, but my focus here is on the ways in 
which photography allows human viewers to pick up a “code” that emanates from 
animals that short-circuits anthropocentrism.     
One of the things, however, that makes working with Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts difficult is the way in which terms and concepts overlap with one another and 
refine one another. To invoke any one concept is to open the door to the whole network 
of concepts in Deleuze and Guattari’s idiom because they are connected to one another 
like elements in a molecule or tubers in a rhizome. The liberatory “line of flight,” for 
example, requires a movement of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization, in turn, brushes 
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up against Deleuze and Guattari’s unique conception of desire, which opens up a 
discussion of the Body without Organs. Setting aside the over-simplification and coarse 
summary, my point here is that these concepts sprawl, and their tendency to open onto 
other concepts makes the task of writing about or working with a particular concept 
difficult. So the work that follows is not meant as an exhaustive or comprehensive 
discussion of becoming-animal and images. Instead, I hope to illuminate a particular kind 
of visual exchange that a few particular aspects of becoming-animal make possible. 
 The majority of Deleuzian film scholarship tends toward a few well-worn 
discussions: faciality, psycho- and schizo- analysis, or an explication of the concepts 
outlined in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2. (See for example, Bogue in Deleuze on Cinema and 
Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema ed. Ian Buchanan and Patricia MacCormack.). 
The essay “Losing Face,” for example, by Gregory Flaxman and Elena Oxman (the third 
chapter of Deleuze and the Schizoanalysis of Cinema) is much more valuable to the study 
of philosophy than it is to the study of cinema. In essays such as these, cinema is 
subordinated to a mere tool of philosophy, valuable only insofar as it serves philosophy’s 
purposes. I would argue, however, that the concept of becoming-animal, which Deleuze 
and Guattari develop more thoroughly in A Thousand Plateaus than anywhere else, might 
actually elicit more lively and productive responses to moving and still images than the 
more common approaches mentioned above. I find the fact that Deleuze and Guattari 
introduce the concept of becoming-animal in a cinematic context more than coincidental. 
Granted, the discussion of Willard that begins the chapter closely resembles the position I 
just criticized insofar as Willard offers an “example” or an image of the concept they 
want to develop. However, the general shape that becoming-animal takes in the course of 
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A Thousand Plateaus’ longest chapter is significant for the study of film because it 
theorizes a model of vision (an accomplishment that marks some of the very best film 
theory) that participates in philosophy and film equally. 
Early on in “Becoming-Animal…” Deleuze and Guattari make very clear the 
argument that becoming has nothing to do with imitation, filiation, or resemblance. They 
write that “resemblance, on the contrary, would represent an obstacle or a stoppage” 
(233) impinging upon the movement of becoming-animal. The question, then, is how to 
conceptualize that movement, if resemblance and imitation are false starts. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s offering of contagion, symbiosis, and especially the idea of “unnatural 
participation” prove to be the most useful ways to describe the movement of becoming-
animal where cinema and photography are concerned. I recognize that this is not a 
complete or exhaustive definition of becoming-animal, but I am willing to overdetermine 
them here in order to highlight their possibilities for an eco-film theory. 
Placing these aspects of becoming-animal into discourse on film and photography 
engenders two distinct effects: on the one hand, photography and films image these 
concepts, and move Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts out of abstraction and make them 
more accessible. On the other hand, imaging becoming-animal promotes new kinds of 
responses to images themselves. Although Henri Cartier-Bresson is known most as a 
street photographer, his images often feature animals in ways that not only invite my 
Deleuzian response, but also in ways that avoid the humanist discourses that relegate 
animals to inferior subject positions and thereby miss out on the politics of sharing 
suffering in Haraway’s idiom, and the liberatory flight of becoming in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s.       
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4.2. Henri Cartier-Bresson’s Nose 
Writing about becoming a professional photographer, Cartier-Bresson recalls 
“from the moment that I began to use the camera and to think about it, however, there 
was an end to holiday snaps and silly pictures of my friends. I became serious. I was on 
the scent of something and I was busy smelling it out” (20, emphasis mine). It is curious 
that Cartier-Bresson describes the process of becoming a serious photographer, 
“dedicating [him]self to Art with a capital ‘A’” (21), in terms of using his camera to 
smell or sniff out his images. It may be easy to hear such a description as a half-joke, or 
as a way to evade betraying the secrets of the Artist’s actual process, but Cartier-
Bresson’s words suggest exactly the opposite; he likens smelling out photographs to 
taking photography seriously, and dedicating himself to the craft. (Indeed thinking 
seriously about animals in any context can easily and often come across as a joke, as in 
The Animal that Therefore I Am’s last chapter, called “I don’t know why we are doing 
this.” And even if Derrida takes animals seriously, the closing section of his book 
registers the possibility that a reader might not.) It would be a mistake, however, to evade 
what thinking seriously about animals and photographs has to offer.  
Bresson’s photo of pigs taken in Holland invites viewers to consider the ways in 
which animals and humans share habitats. The photo takes us to a farm within a 
sprawling landscape. The pigs’ enclosures seem too narrow for the animals within. Front 
and center in the photo is a brick, house-like structure that almost seems to be an echo of 
the farmhouse that although out of frame, is undoubtedly near-by. But the most important 
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quality of the photo is that it captures two of the five pigs with their front legs atop the 
front of their enclosures, peering out over them. (Counting from foreground to 
background, a fifth pig’s ears are just visible behind the pig looking out of the pen.) The 
demonstrative posture of these two curious pigs may initially strike viewers as charming. 
Noses held high, the pigs could almost pass for sailors who have spotted land. The pigs 
communicate a keen awareness of an exterior; they are drawn toward the space beyond 
their brick boxes. The photo may amuse viewers—indeed we ought to appreciate the 
personality of the pigs and their curiosity.  
 
Figure 4.1 
The charm of the photo, however, performs a function that does much more than 
simply entertain viewers with “cute” pigs. The photo allows viewers to share in the pigs’ 
confinement, and thus their suffering. The photo’s—and the pigs’—charm depends upon 
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a mutual understanding of confinement and longing between the human viewer and the 
pig subjects. For Akira Lippit, “Identifying with the animal is part of the process of 
becoming-animal” (180) as he links animals and photography together near the end of 
Electric Animal. Cartier-Bresson, writing again about how to take photographs, argues 
that “We must respect the atmosphere which surrounds the human being, and integrate 
into the portrait the individual’s habitat—for man, no less than animals, has his habitat” 
(30-1). The photograph of the pigs is a visual expression of this argument. Certainly the 
pigs, at least in part, constitute “the atmosphere which surrounds” whatever farmers also 
inhabit this space. Yet the photo shows us no farmers, so the pigs are definitely the 
subjects of the photo. And in fact, being charmed by the photo’s the demonstrative pigs 
modifies the quotation slightly, making the “no less than” qualifier a moot point. Being 
charmed by pigs that want to see the world beyond their enclosure presupposes a sense of 
enclosure on the part of the charmed.  
This exchange between pig subject and human viewer, the mutual sense of 
confinement, and the apparent desire for exterior space beyond cloistered stalls, these 
requisite exchanges between pig and viewer for experiencing the photograph hold 
important implications for the question of becoming-animal and images. In contrast to 
filiation or resemblance, Deleuze and Guattari propose that becoming-animal is (at least 
in part) the result of “not pity, but unnatural participation” (240). It will be helpful here, 
to clarify the concept of “unnatural participation” as it will become an increasingly 
important concept for this chapter. 
For me, the concept of unnatural participation directly confronts the question of 
how images operate within an animal and ecological context. Why should a photograph, 
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an arbitrary frame, cause a human subject outside of the photograph to share in a sense of 
animal enclosure?  Susan Sontag argues that “photography is essentially an act of non-
intervention” (11) but careful consideration of the relationship between animals and 
images complicates Sontag’s claim. As Sontag’s ideas indicate, it is easy to think of the 
photographic subject as confined and trapped within the image, but Cartier-Bresson’s 
photograph of animal captivity surprisingly locates captivity within both the subject and 
the viewer. And although Cartier-Bresson photographs the pigs, rather than intervening 
on behalf of their liberation, intervention occurs nevertheless, but not where one might 
expect. Rather than either the photographer or the viewer, it is the photographic subject 
that intervenes into the life of the viewer: looking at the image pushes viewers to 
participate in an unnatural sense of confinement inaugurated by the cuteness and charm 
of the pigs themselves. I call this process unnatural for several reasons.  
First, the humanist (read anthropocentric) discourses Derrida critiques in The 
Animal that Therefore I Am would undoubtedly make the claim that the conscious, 
thinking-therefore-being human has every right to confine un-conscious and poor-in-
world animals. From this point of view, then, it is not natural for the human subject to 
participate in the animal’s confinement. Secondly, Cartier-Bresson’s photograph enacts 
an unnatural participation between two disparate temporalities; that of the photograph 
and of the phenomenological world of the viewer. We often describe being taken aback 
or fascinated by a photograph as being captivated, but Cartier-Bresson’s photograph 
literalizes the captivating postures and expressivity of the pigs: to be captivated by this 
photograph is to share, even slightly, the captivity of the pigs within the photo which 
comprises a becoming-animal that originates from several unnatural participations. Thus 
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the post- or non-human concept of becoming-animal, enacted by Cartier-Bresson’s photo 
short-circuits the discourse that relegates confinement to animals, and duly contradicts 
the idea the phenomenological, ecological world of the viewer remains untouched by the 
worlds within images. Becoming-animal, by way of an unnatural participation, 
constitutes a particular kind of ecological vision for the study of film and photography.        
Cartier-Bresson’s photo, and his writing about photography, initiate a becoming-
animal that operates along the lines of what Deleuze and Guattari call contagion that 
performs another function in addition to the ecological vision that exchanges the sense of 
confinement from pig to human. This ecological, becoming-animal, mode of vision also 
allows the important question of pathos and animals, raised by Derrida in The Animal 
that Therefore I Am, to be approached without recourse to humanist discourses that 
privilege human over animal life. According to Derrida’s deconstruction, such discourses 
victimize animals, wage war against them, or understand animals as (supposedly) lacking 
what humans have—namely language and reason. (Of course, such discourses were 
sharply criticized long before Derrida’s intervention, notably in Jeremy Bentham’s 
writing, which Derrida recognizes: “Bentham said something like this: the question is not 
to know whether the animal can think, reason, or speak, etc., something we still pretend 
to be asking ourselves…and this question determines so many others…The first and 
decisive question would rather be to know whether animals can suffer. ‘Can they suffer?’ 
asks Bentham simply yet profoundly” (Derrida 27). Cartier-Bresson’s photograph asks 
viewers to share in some sense of the suffering of animals without perpetuating the 
violences of anthropocentric discourses that would speak for animals, or the 
anthropomorphism that would “give” language back to animals and force them to speak.  
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It is, however, important to note that becoming-animal is not an equation or 
substitution, it is more of a movement, a transmission, or even an attraction. In the 
example from Cartier-Bresson, being charmed by the pigs transmits the shared misery of 
enclosure from pig to human. The sharing does not necessarily have to be distributed or 
experienced equally to be meaningful, and Donna Haraway questions the very prospect 
of what an “equal” relationship between humans and animals might be, and whether such 
a relationship is either possible or productive for minimizing the suffering of animals in 
her book When Species Meet. Haraway argues that sharing suffering “must be lived and 
developed inside unequal, instrumental relations linking human and nonhuman animals in 
research as well as other sorts of activities” (84)—I count photography, both taking and 
viewing photos, as one of those “other activities” and one of its best attributes is that 
photography remains at ease (like Elizabeth Costello) with animals’ refusal of speech.  
PETA’s images of animal suffering, on the other hand, attempt almost exactly the 
opposite gesture. They proceed from the assumption that animals need to speak, and they 
attempt to speak for and in the place of animals with images that attempt to display 
suffering in such a way that merely assaults viewers, rather than an image that invites 
viewers to share suffering. The result here is that PETA’s images and their attempts to 
speak for animals participate in a philosophical war against animals that assumes human 
existence is a standard or ideal, and that animals are mere victims that lack language. 
Sharing suffering requires an encounter, an exchange, or a participation that engenders it.    
Returning for the moment to Electric Animal, Lippit details a philosophical 
tradition of defining the human against the animal through philosophy’s suspicion of the 
sense of smell. For many animals, especially dogs, for example, the sense of smell 
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amounts to an “epistemological basis for the dog’s existence” (122). And philosophy has 
in the past sought to displace this epistemology. Lippit reminds us that for Horkheimer 
and Adorno, “smelling stirs up the recollection of distant and shameful forms of 
existence” (123). Read in conjunction with Freud’s comments on smell, these past forms 
of existence are clearly animal: “Freud also charts the emergence of humanity from the 
olfactory world of animals by following the movement of humanity away from the sense 
of smell and toward that of sight” (123 emphasis mine).  
What I find fascinating in Lippit’s reading of Freud is that the development of the 
biological category we call human charts a particular movement regarding the importance 
of the senses; according to the logic philosophy has outlined, we become increasingly 
human as we place a higher (epistemological and sensory) value on sight, and learn to be 
skeptical of smell. This is a fairly outcome of philosophy’s attempt to define the human. 
The disavowal of smell as an embarrassing evolutionary holdover, reminding humans of 
their animal origins can be understood easily enough. In keeping with the discourses of 
humanism, culture and civilization have allowed (some of) us to achieve comfortable, 
urbane existences that have erased from our memory and experience the squalor and 
struggle to survive that marks the world of animals. But the premium on vision, as an 
index for what counts as human is puzzling. Comparatively speaking, one does not have 
to look long or hard to find animals whose ocular faculties are far superior to ours. Many 
varieties of birds immediately spring to mind, but even dogs—the animal that Lippit’s 
discussion begins with—often have keener senses of sight than we do. So where has 
vision’s superiority taken us? Perhaps the advent of photography represents a triumph of 
what human technicity and culture can accomplish as it privileges sight over smell.  
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If seeing is believing, then Cartier-Bresson’s declaration that he “smell[s] out” his 
photograph radically bends the trajectory of human experience back toward animals by 
theorizing his Art on the basis of using smell as his primary engagement with the 
environment he photographs. Smelling out a photograph, therefore, describes a 
becoming-animal that has nothing to do with filiation or resemblance but through the 
nose’s unnatural participation in the visual. 
It is worth noting the Cartier-Bresson’s pig photograph does not homogenize the 
animals it features. Without a doubt, my eye is drawn immediately to the pig nearest the 
foreground.  Likewise, Deleuze and Guattari allow for variation within a pack: “wherever 
there is multiplicity, you will also find an exceptional individual, and it is with that 
individual that an alliance must be made in order to become animal” (243). “That the 
anomalous is the borderline makes it easier for us to understand the various positions it 
occupies in relation to the pack or the multiplicity it borders” (245). Without a doubt, the 
“anomalous” pig is the one who stands the highest, the one that is especially charming, 
the one most amenable to the impulse (however dubious) to anthropomorphism, who 
stands at the threshold between containment and freedom, between the striated space of 
the enclosure and the smooth space of the pasture. And it is this anomalous pig that acts 
as a conduit, relaying the shared sense of containment and enclosure between the human 
viewer and the ungulate pack. This becoming-animal inaugurated by Cartier-Bresson’s 
photograph opens up a new way to think about the relationship between images and 
politics that avoids predictable and tired conversations about representation.  
 Like Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts, the effects of photographically becoming-
animal have their own sprawl. Deleuze’s concepts are not “individual” or “isolated.” This 
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kind of becoming-animal verges on the ethics of speaking-before mentioned in 
“Geophilosopy” from What Is Philosophy? This, however, is a political response that 
sidesteps the trappings of discourse limited to representation. Representation, of course, 
is too closely related to the obstacles to becoming posed by resemblance and imitation. 
One of the models for what could be provisionally called “subversion” or “politics” 
Deleuze and Guattari favor is contagion. The idea of contagion gets the majority of their 
attention in A Thousand Plateaus in the chapter “Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Intense, 
Becoming Imperceptible” It is not a mere coincidence, however, that contagion comes up 
in A Thousand Plateaus in the context of both cinema and becoming-animal. Looking at 
Cartier-Bresson’s photograph of pigs leaves me with the distinct feeling of having been 
not only exposed to but infected with the enclosure that marks the lives of the pigs. 
(Exposure, coincidentally being a key term for both immunology and photography, 
echoing the idea that becoming-animal operates through a process marked by contagion.) 
Describing the effect of an image on viewers as contagion ascribes a political context to 
photography in Deleuze and Guattari’s economy of concepts that evades the politics of 
representation. Instead, what contagion allows for is what Artaud calls the “occult life” of 
an image accessible within images—“But we have to know how to divine this occult 
life…To use it to tell stories, a superficial series of deeds, is to deprive it of the finest of 
its resources, to disavow its most profound purpose…What is certain is that most forms 
of representation have had their day” (Artaud 104). Although Artaud means by “most 
forms of representation” the various art forms that predate photography and the cinema, it 
resonates nicely with the sentiment of Slavoj Žižek’s argument that “the struggle for 
liberation is not reducible to a struggle for the ‘right to narrate,’ to the struggle of 
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deprived marginal groups to freely articulate their position” (190). In contrast (but 
perhaps not necessarily in opposition) to representation, telling stories, or narration I want 
to insert encounter, sensation, and contagion as terms to describe a viewer’s relationship 
to an image—in other words, divining and conjuring, which are the two words preferred 
by Artaud and Deleuze and Guattari.  
The “occult life” Cartier-Bresson’s photo invites viewers into pierces (even if 
only partially of temporarily) the border between human and pig, an occult photographic 
life that radically rejects the privileged status of language in order to put human viewers 
into contact with non-human suffering. According to Deleuze and Guattari, 
representation, as opposed to contagion, asks the wrong questions: “the question, 
therefore, is not whether the status of women, or those on the bottom, is better or worse, 
but the type of organization from which that status results” (A Thousand Plateaus 210). 
The politics of representation might argue that circulating the horrific details of animal 
suffering in images such as PETA’s might improve animals’ living (and dying) 
conditions. “If only they knew…” as the expression goes, when in fact, we know very 
well that animals suffer, but easily disavow it because such photos are only contagious in 
terms of a shock-value that has very little to do with animals themselves. Cartier-
Bresson’s photo, on the other hand, invites humans into contact, or unnatural 
participation with, animal suffering, suggesting a poignant organization resulting from 
the marginalization of animals: perhaps if we were unwilling to allow animal suffering, 
we might also refuse to tolerate human suffering—not because humans are superior to 
animals and thus deserve better treatment but because of how easily the border between 
us can be crossed. 
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As a point of departure from Cartier-Bresson, I would like to include an example 
of the kind of images that work toward exactly the opposite effects. Rather than enact any 
becomings, productively open the question of pathos, or inaugurate any politics of 
sharing suffering, animal photographs that circulate online, in social media often 
foreclose the liberatory possibilities of these concepts. Of course, any analysis along 
these lines is going to require some cherry-picking as there is no way to work 
“comprehensively” with online animal images. So what follows is some analysis of 
animal photographs which are representative of the kinds of images which get widely 
circulated in a variety of online platforms.  
 
4.3. The Social (Media) Animal 
Conversations about social media platforms, academic or popular, tend to obsess 
over the question of social media’s impact on human, face-to-face relationships.  And 
while these are important conversations to pursue, perhaps more thought out to be given 
to social media’s impact on human-animal relations. Buzzfeed.com, for example, devotes 
a significant chunk of their site to animals specifically. Regularly updated, visitors to this 
portion of the site will encounter images of unlikely breeds (pit-bull-dachshund mix, 
e.g.), unlikely behaviors, and unlikely feats. On January 28, 2015, however, buzzfeed 
posted a series of images taken from a blog called “RaisingTheRuf” that merit careful 
consideration vis-à-vis the question of digital human-animal relationships.  
RaisingTheRuf.com is named for Rufus, a three-year old Pharaoh hound located 
in Santa Monica, CA. The blog consists of photographs and videos of Rufus in various 
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scenarios of make-believe because, according to the “About” section of the website, 
written supposedly in Rufus’ voice, “My mom hopes these photos and videos make you 
smile as big as I do.” (One of Rufus’ tricks is to pull the corners of his mouth back into a 
“smile.”) 
Sara Rehnmark, Rufus’ “mom” photographs Rufus and runs the blog. Typically, 
her photos are taken while Rufus sleeps in order to guarantee his docility and complicity 
with Sara’s project. Although these photos in no way involve physical harm to the dog, I 
want to highlight their inherent and arrant violence as they replicate and image the worst 
forms of Humanist thought and dominance over non-human life.  
As I mentioned above, the majority of RaisingTheRuf’s photos are taken while 
Rufus sleeps. On the one hand, this is a practical decision because the scenes into which 
Rufus is inserted are elaborate and require precise positioning for their verisimilitude and 
desired effect. Consider, for example, this domestic scene where Rufus appears to be 





I would argue however, that Rufus’ sleep is much more than a practical concern: rather 
than initiate a conversation about the miracle that non-human species also share in the 
experience of dreams, RaisingTheRuf capitalizes on canine sleep as an occasion to live 
out Humanist dreams of “restoring” language and technicity to animal being. One of the 
classic arguments for maintaining a clear division between human and animal life centers 
around tools. The Humanist logic of this argument holds that humans can fashion and use 
tools, animals cannot. And while few people might hold rigidly or absolutely to this 
divisor between humans and animals, its sentiment has certainly not died out entirely. 
Thus a well-intentioned, but ultimately Humanist animal-lover hopes we will smile to see 
the image of a dog-as-tool-savvy-homemaker, brightening up a home not through its 
presence, but through its keen sense of interior decorating.  
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In fact, this image (like most of the blog) actually forbids animal existence as 
such. Rufus, apparently, exists here as an interior decorator, worth looking at only 
because of his ability to use tools. Close examination shows that Rufus appears to be 
hanging a picture of himself. This makes perfect sense, according to the logic that 
occasions the photograph. If Rufus is going to become a humanoid interior decorator, 
then his tastes should mimic a human’s. Thus we see Rufus displaying his fondness of 
portraiture, hanging a framed picture of himself, posed in front of some birch trees. And 
this portrait suggests a second way for Rufus to occupy photographic space: as décor. 
Because he is inert, sleeping, this photo, typical of the entire blog, reduces Rufus’ 
corporeality to the status of a prop. The docile body of the sleeping dog is as manipulable 
and inanimate as the drawing featured in the frame. 
 By imagining Rufus as both a tool-capable interior decorator, and simply as 
décor, the photograph ends up disavowing the animality of the animal. Both the 
photographer and the viewer know very well that Rufus is a dog, but what if her were a 
decorator? What if her were décor? The question arises, then, why is Rufus the dog 
unbearable to look at? There can be no doubt that RaisingTheRuf got onto 
Buzzfeed.com’s radar by virtue of its elaborate and unique vision for animal 
photography. And so any popularity the blog enjoys results directly from it having 
achieved its goal of making visitors smile. Why do both the photographer and viewer 
smile wider at photos of a dog as anything-but-a-dog than at photos of a dog? Once our 
philosophers asked “Why look at animals?” but RaisingTheRuf forces us toward 
regression, asking instead: “Do we look at animals?” 
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4.4. Why Look at Slaughterhouses? 
The question concerning animals and photographs extends far beyond political 
and philosophical discussions of rights. The way our world responds to each term in this 
unlikely alliance—animal and image—promises serious and material consequences for 
animals, images, and humans alike in the world we all share. The legal implications of 
this alliance are clearly spelled out in the recent spate of so-called “Ag gag” bills 
appearing in US State legislations in recent years.  
Perhaps one of the reasons the environmental movement was slow to take hold in 
the United States is because of the inability—or unwillingness—for separate individuals 
to understand themselves as part of a network of connections to the ecosystems that 
surround them. Food, and a couple of recent Idaho and Indiana state senate bills, provides 
an apt context for considering how the relationship between humans and the environment 
breaks down. Consumer culture and the industrialization of agriculture have widened the 
gaps between what we eat, where our food comes from, and the ecological effects of its 
production. For the average consumer, the relationships between these things are 
nebulous at best. In some instances in fact, gaining access to and learning about the 
places our food comes from is becoming increasingly difficult. Recent legislation in the 
United States, such as Idaho Senate Bill 1337 and Indiana Senate Bill 101 seek to 
criminalize entrance into and filming facilities that produce meat. Such legal measures 
deliberately restrict access to the places food comes from, presumably to maintain a 
dubious status quo where the animals people eat are treated in an unsavory fashion.  
 These kinds of bills are alarming for a number of reasons. The most obvious point 
of contention here is that they restrict the meat industry’s accountability to the public, and 
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they restrict the public’s access to the learning about meat production. These restrictions 
widen the ecological gulf that separates people from the process by which their food 
arrives to them by keeping meat production invisible. Marx’s crucial concept of the 
commodity fetish immediately springs to mind as a way to highlight the importance of 
knowing where, by whom, and how the products we consume are produced. But in the 
instance of meat, divided neatly into serving sizes and wrapped cleanly in glossy saran 
wrap, the alienation that divides consumers from product adds problems such as anti-
biotic resistant disease and ecological damage to the familiar Marxist concerns for factory 
conditions, wages, etc. In fact, disrupting the feedback loop of commodity fetishization 
where ignorance of production encourages guilt-free consumption is entirely within the 
power of the cinema. Dziga Vertov, the Soviet filmmaker and film theorist described his 
kinoks’ goals thus: “Our basic, programmatic objective is to aid each oppressed 
individual and the proletariat as a whole in their effort to understand the phenomena of 
life around them” (Vertov 49). In the context of Idaho Senate Bill 1337 and Indiana 
Senate Bill 101, the factory farms and large agricultural businesses that no doubt fund the 
politicians who drafted the bills perhaps recognize the relationship between images, 
animals, the environment, and capital better than most film and ecocritical scholars—
hence legislative efforts to stem documentary images of the production of meat.        
  In addition to concerns about restricted access, these legislative measures also 
strangely link humans who would investigate meat production with the animals that will 
become meat insofar as both people and animals remain powerless in the face of industry. 
(The human and animal positions here are by no means interchangeable, but there 
remains a certain vulnerability shared between the two as they are subject to the will, 
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procedures, and whims of the meat industry.) Secondly, these state senate bills imagine 
images as threats to an industrial status quo that creates a miserable existence for animals; 
the implication is that filming compromises the industry’s sovereignty over animals. 
According to Idaho SB 1337, “A person commits the crime of interference with 
agricultural production if the person knowingly…[e]nters an agricultural production 
facility without the facility owner’s express consent or pursuant to judicial process or 
statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of an agricultural 
production facility’s operations” (l.11-28).   
Again, the bills create an unlikely affiliation.  Here they align images with 
animals in the sense that the meat industry seems to be able to address animals and 
images exclusively through containment and subjugation. These intriguing affiliations are 
of course in addition to the numerous studies that have been published linking the 
production and transport of meat to ecological damage and climate change. But here is a 
current and political context that summons research combining ecology, animals, and 
Film Studies. Of course these so-called “Ag gag” bills should be struck down, but the 
implications of the alignments they imply have the potential to create new relationships 
between humans, animals, images, and the environment that might revitalize these 
disciplines’ capacity to address the ecological crises that haunt our future.   
 If the constitution of individuals keeps people estranged from the environment, 
then it also keeps people estranged from images. Watching a film or viewing a 
photograph as a discrete individual, as a Cartesian subject, permits the viewer to keep the 
image at a safe distance. The implication is that because a film is not “real” it doesn’t 
affect the individual. But of course many scholars who work intimately with cinema and 
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photography wholly reject this mode of viewing. For example, in Gilles Deleuze’s 
Cinema 2: The Time-Image, Deleuze combats the idea that images occur at a removal 
from the world by arguing that responses to images “[indicate] the relation between man 
and world, between man and nature…Cinema seems to have a real vocation in this 
respect” (161). Elsewhere, Deleuze intensifies this argument wit the idea that “Restoring 
our belief in the world—this is the power of modern cinema” (172). I understand 
Deleuze’s use of the word belief to describe the relationship between cinema and the 
world as analogous to the relay or collision between novels and the world that Deleuze 
and Guattari describe in the “Rhizome” chapter of A Thousand Plateaus where they 
argue “contrary to a deeply rooted belief, the book is not an image of the world. It forms 
a rhizome with the world” (11). The point is that for Deleuze, works of art do not seal 
themselves off from the world as mere representations of it; they are neither mirrors held 
up to the world nor well-wrought urns that unify the tensions they create. Works of art 
are part of the world, and they connect to the world in order to alter it. The idea that light 
and images on a screen participate in the world off-screen is the sense in which I read 
Deleuze’s use of the word “belief.”  
 This idea seems to be fairly well-established in film studies and visual culture. 
Ron Burnett argues, for example, in his book How Images Think “images are virtual 
because they are distant from the spectator or user but are experienced as if that distance 
could, and in some instances, must be overcome” (72).  The nature of this “experience,” 
however, the structure of what Deleuze calls “belief”, must be read as ecological. 
Discussing the relationship between the world of photographs and the world of the 
viewer, Susan Sontag uses ecology both literally and metaphorically to theorize a way of 
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bridging this divide: “[i]mages are more real than anyone could have supposed. And just 
because they are an unlimited resource, one that cannot be exhausted by consumerist 
waste, there is all the more reason to apply the conservationist remedy. If there can be a 
better way for the real world to include images, it will require an ecology not only of real 
things, but of images as well” (180). Belief in this world, in terms of revitalizing the 
connections between humans and the environment, is precisely what is needed to combat 
the manifold forces that threaten the earth’s ecosystems, animals, oceans, etc. Belief in 
the world, as precipitated by images requires a new way of looking. It does not make 
sense to consider images as imitations of the world; rather, cinema and photography are 
the manifestations of the world become image. Viewing films and photographs as the 
world-become-images opens up an entirely new range of questions and experience. In 
this sense, my research is about articulating an eco-film theory that maps vital 
connections between images and the environment that are currently unexplored. Until a 
transformative eco-film theory takes hold, film scholars will be unable to address 
ecological problems and ecocritical scholars will continue to view films and photographs 
as mere images of the world, rather than benefit from the idea that they are the world 
become image. 
Although John Berger’s essay “Photographs of Agony” primarily discusses 
Donald McCullin’s reportage from the Vietnam War and those images’ effects on 
viewers, Berger’s description of the dead and wounded Vietnamese bodies “bleeding 
profusely with the black blood of black-and-white photographs” might just as well apply 
to the animals of Blood of the Beasts. Berger argues that “The most literal adjective that 
could be applied to [such images] is arresting” (42) and ironically, producing such 
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images could now get one arrested thanks to the kinds of state senate bills described 
above. One might object precisely at this moment that it is an ethical problem to conflate 
the cost of human life with that of animal life. This is exactly the objection leveled 
against Elizabeth Costello in a letter she receives in The Lives of Animals. According to 
one of Costello’s critics, a comparison between human and animal slaughter (and 
Costello even invokes the Holocaust “misunderstand[s] the nature of likenesses…[and] 
insults the memory of the [human] dead. It also trades on the horrors of the camps in a 
cheap way” (Coetzee 50). And while I do not altogether agree with either Costello or her 
critic’s point of view, I certainly recognize the treachery of the comparison and its 
potential to offend. What I would argue, however, is that this dichotomy, or dispute, 
depends entirely upon a conversation that turn on rights. Rights-based appeals, of course, 
are what Derrida takes to task as “pathetic” attempts to open the question of pathos where 
animals are concerned. Blood of the Beasts, in this sense, deserves serious consideration 
as a vast improvement upon those attempts, which reach their broadest appeal in PETA-
style films and photos. 
 Jeanette Sloniowski’s essay “‘It Was an Atrocious Film’ Georges Franju’s Blood 
of the Beasts” sets out an apt comment on the overwhelming discomfort of the film: 
The problem of a documentary like Blood of the Beasts is that it resists easy 
classification as a moral statement about cruelty to animals, or humankind’s 
survival at the price of the deaths of its fellow creatures, or even as an allegory 
about the Holocaust…Franju’s film resolutely resists easy categorization. It would 
be far more comfortable for spectators to suffer the pain of Blood of the Beasts if 
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moral reassurance or a lesson learned was a clear and comfortable position when 
the film had run its course. But Franju…sounds no morally reassuring note. (172) 
From the Derridean perspective, however, the “problem” of classification as a moral 
statement becomes an attractive attribute for Blood of the Beasts. As the moral statements 
incline toward “giving” language to animals, the refusal to moralize can be seen as an 
attempt to meet animals closer to their domain. Elizabeth Costello expresses a 
complementary idea when assessing Ted Hughes’ poem about a jaguar: “when we divert 
the current of feeling that flows between ourself and the animal into words, we abstract it 
forever from the animal…It falls within an entirely human economy” (Coetzee 51). 
Blood of the Beasts’ refusal to moralize or even narrate the fate of animals in the 
slaughterhouse not only refuses the pitfalls of rights-based appeals, it also gives way in a 
few fleeting moments to becoming-animal. (This is of course not to say that there is no 
narration in the film, but that the narration concerns itself—and limits itself—entirely to 
the purview of human experience: the trains, suburbs and churches outside the 
slaughterhouse, the tools used by the men and women inside it, the methods of butchery, 
etc.) 
 Rather than attempt to speak for animals, Blood of the Beasts affords brief 
moments of becoming-animal, where human viewers encounter something of the 
animals’ experience. One such instance is when we see animals forced inside the 









Although slightly difficult to make out, this image shows cows simultaneously being 
pushed and pulled into the space where they will be killed. In another moment, we see 
cows being driven across a bridge, into the slaughterhouse, but the camera is placed 
directly in front of the animals as they approach. 
 
Figure 4.5 
This is the crucial image. Being driven into the camera and being driven into the 
slaughterhouse amounts to nearly the same thing. The film’s “exceedingly cruel and 
violent images” make it, for Jeanette Sloniowski, “one of the most emotionally grueling 
films imaginable” (171) and I would argue that this response is the result of a becoming-
animal where the horror and sadness of the cows’ failure to refuse entrance into the 
slaughterhouse passes through the human viewer, registering as a failure to resist the film 
itself. In this sense, Blood of the Beasts speaks before animals “not ‘for their benefit,’ 
or…‘in their place’” (Deleuze and Guattari 109) but by a “zone of exchange” where the 
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suffering of the cows passes through the human viewer suffering through Franju’s film. 
Again, the point here not at all to ask whether the suffering is equitable. They are not 
equal positions of suffering, and only a rights-based, anthropocentric point of view would 
raise the issue. The point is that the film manages to avoid precisely that question by 
offering us an opportunity for becoming-animal. 
 This becoming-animal, the unlikely alliance between slaughtered animal and 
sickened viewer (between the animals that will become meat and the viewers who eat it) 
reaches its peak once the cattle are well within the slaughterhouse. Once they are inside, 
we see two different cows examine their new surroundings with eyes that are wild and 
upset—exactly the kind of eyes with which I am seeing the film. The cows stretch their 
necks to try to look around in shock while being held down on slatted tables where they 






The panic in the eyes of the calves—being killed for veal meat, the narrator explains—
becomes my own as I watch their deaths and squirm. One cow, after being killed, seems 
to stare directly into the camera. As a result of sharing something of the suffering of the 
cow, I cannot help but see an accusatory look in the cow’s eye, motivated not by a 
narrator’s moralizing but by a sense of betrayal. The image seems to recall, in an entirely 
surrealist echo, the moment in Sherlock, Jr. when Buster Keaton, after discovering that 
the audience has known he was alone on the motorcycle all along, looks back into the 






The questions asked by Blood of the Beasts, however, differs slightly from that of 
Sherlock Jr. Buster Keaton’s look into the camera confronts viewers with the questions of 
spectacle: why does danger entertain us? What does it mean to laugh at Buster’s peril? 
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The dead stare of the cows in Blood of the Beasts, on the other hand ask viewers to 
consider what it means to have seen everyday horrors that typically go unseen.  
 Discussing Franju’s film, Jonathan Burt reminds us that “it was filmed in a 
different era, one in which the slaughter process was less mechanized” (Burt 175). 
Indeed, in addition to the casually grotesque imaging of animal deaths and 
disembowelment, Blood of the Beasts’ shocking effect also comes from the intensely 
intimate work of the people within the slaughterhouse. The film describes the visual and 
auditory conditions the workers inhabit:  “In the deafening din of pneumatic hoists, 
slaughterers and scalders work in the gray steam rising from the blood of the beasts.” (In 
addition to the visual and auditory description, one does not need to work too hard to 
imagine too an olfactory account of the slaughterhouse.) And yet, the men and women we 
see on screen who work here show no signs of squeamishness; they work deliberately, 
they whistle, they smoke cigarettes. This, I believe, is a crucial aspect of the film. 
Attempting to alleviate the horror and discomfort the film induces, my eyes occasionally 
find themselves moving away from the blood, organs, carcasses, and severed skulls and 
onto the workers themselves—their faces, their movements in the background. However, 
the visceral and intimate nature of their labor actually doubles down on the sickening 
feeling that comes from the animal dismemberment. In the year 2015, with full 
knowledge of factory farming, the shock of Franju’s film has evolved since it was first 
released. What the film shows us, unsettling and awful as it is, may actually be seen by 
viewers who care for animals with nostalgia. Nostalgia for a time when animals might 
actually have enjoyed a less tortuous experience of this world than they now do. 
According to Mark Rowlands, if you are a cow in the twenty-first century, destined to 
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become beef, then “during the course of your life you can expect to be dehorned, 
branded, and castrated without anaesthetic” (Rowlands 108). (This expectation has not 
been chosen, by the way, for any kind of shock value. It is, sadly, representative.)  
And the point here, is that Blood of the Beasts refuses to allow viewers to 
maintain the disavowal that structures the consumption of animals (“Yes I know very 
well that animals are treated brutally, but…”) Blood of the Beasts is a shocking disruption 
to that disavowal but it is also nearly impossible to imagine it being made in 2015. The 
so-called “Ag gag” laws—undoubtedly written and paid for by the meat industry—
restrict access to the kinds of procedures and conditions that have become even more 
appalling in the decades since Franju took his camera into the Vaugiraud Slaughterhouse, 
as meat production has become absurdly industrial and mechanical. Perhaps it is because 
the days when people had to be intimate with the processes, sights, sounds, and smells of  
“eviscerating” (in the idiom of Franju’s film) animals are over that cameras are not longer 
allowed inside the slaughterhouse. What “Ag gag” bills ultimately cost us, then, is the 
change to disrupt the feedback loop of ignorance and disavowal that sustains miserable 
existences for livestock. We know very well that factory farming is cruel and brutal, but 
if the “Ag gag” bills take hold, then there will be no modern Blood of the Beasts to open 
up the question of pathos and animals. We will be stuck with rights-based images that 
unwittingly work against the transformative becomings-animal that we badly need. In 





4.5. An Unsightly View  
 
Figure 4.10 
On May 26 of this year, Chicago’s Sun Times newspaper’s website published an 
image that seemingly instantly went viral on social media (“CPD Cops Posed for 
Photo…”) Amid controversies surrounding police and the communities they serve 
affecting places as disparate as Ferguson, MO, Staten Island, NY, Cleveland, OH, and 
Baltimore, MD, the image showcases two white cops proudly holding rifles and crouched 
over a black man wearing deer antlers. The photograph forces viewers to consider the 
ways in which violence against animals permits violence against humans. The idea is not 
new. Philosophical discussions about the difference between being killed and being 
murdered have served as a way to highlighting the arbitrariness of who has rights in the 
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modern world. Others, such as Derrida, point out that rights-based appeals for livable 
conditions insufficiently address the problems at hand. This photograph, however, makes 
a few visual links that pose important questions. Given the bulletin boards of tacked-up 
lists, charts, and black-and-white wanted photographs, the photograph must have been 
taken in a police station. But the hunting signifiers transform the police station into the 
hunting lodge. And given the camouflaging tactics of police, whose cars in the Pacific 
Northwest are typically forest or “hunter” green, in order to be masked by the region’s 
lush flora, or whose vehicle make and model might be unmarked altogether in order to 
blend in with civilian traffic, the photograph is not so much a perverse and inappropriate 
reference to hunting so much as it literalizes the cop-as-urban-hunter status quo to an 
appalling and disquieting degree. And most obviously, the hunted, the killed-but-not-
murdered life form, aligns the racial minority with the animal along two oppressive lines 
of what I will reluctantly deem thought. Firstly, the idea is that animals are inferior 
beings. And thus reducing the black human to the status of animal produces an insult that 
makes possible the second line of thought which is that as an inferior being, the black 
man is subject to both the superiority and violence of the white man authorized by the 
state to carry a gun (hunt.) The photograph enters into circulation in the midst of a 
cultural moment where citizens are mobilizing their objections to how their communities 
are policed, but the Sun-Times article dates the photograph to “between 1999 and 2003” 
(Main and Janssen). And although the offending officers attempted to keep the 
photograph under wraps, its relationship to both the past moment in which it was taken 
and the present moment of widespread dissent gives it a ghostly or spectral quality that 
Derrida describes as “Enter the ghost, Exit the ghost, Enter the ghost as before. A 
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question of repetition: a specter is always a revenant. One cannot control its comings and 
goings because it begins by coming back” (11). 
 
4.6. Hauntology and the Problem of Inheritance 
 As early as 1945, André Bazin laid a modest foundation for a non-human 
conception of photography in his famous essay “The Ontology of the Photographic 
Image”: “[t]oday the making of images no longer shares an anthropocentric, utilitarian 
purpose. It is no longer a question of survival after death, but of a larger concept, the 
creation of an ideal world in the likeness of the real…All the arts are based on the 
presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence” (10-3). 
Bazin’s original context for these remarks has to do with his response to the idea that the 
camera mechanically and automatically reproduces the world, which is distinct from, for 
example, painting, where the brushstrokes, creation of colors, and style reflect an overtly 
human hand rendering the subject. Whereas in photography, Bazin allows that the 
selection and framing of the world might reflect or be determined by a human eye, but 
the actual process of reproduction does not. But these remarks have the capacity to 
illuminate more than the literal recording of light by a camera. Put into an ecological 
context, Bazin’s theorizing invites one to consider what a non-anthropocentric 
photography might make possible. 
 I would argue, of course, that Henri Cartier-Bresson’s photograph of pigs, 
alongside his own theorization of photography, and Georges Franju’s Blood of the Beasts 
at least partly answer the question. (Certainly the way Bresson diminishes the 
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photographer’s intrusiveness with recourse to animal metaphors decenters whatever 
anthropocentrism a photographer might perpetuate without heeding Bresson’s advice.) In 
Bazin’s idiom, Cartier-Bresson’s directions asking photographers to look at the world 
like an animal might derives an advantage over anthropocentric photographs such as 
those on RaisingTheRuf.com, an advantage that creates a photographic space for or 
encounter with what Deleuze and Guattari call becoming-animal.  
Smelling out a photograph anticipates a kind of animal epistemology described by 
Akira Mizuta Lippit thus: “[f]or animals, the foundations of perception and cognition 
(and perhaps even affect) remain entrenched in an atmosphere determined by odors” 
(124). The intimacy shared by photography and animals reaches a kind of apex for Lippit 
in what he calls the “animetaphor…the unconscious of language, of logos” (165). Lippit 
anchors his animetaphor to Derrida and the project of deconstruction where in “Plato’s 
Pharmacy” Derrida writes “Logos is a zoon. An animal that is born, grows, belongs to 
phusis” (as quoted in Lippit 165).  
I want to conclude this chapter with an argument that runs parallel to Lippit’s. 
Whereas Lippit appeals to Derrida in order to emphasize the importance of photography’s 
relation to animals for language (logos) in the animetaphor, I want to appeal to Derrida 
here in order to say something of the political dimension at work here concerning animal 
images that open the question of pathos in valuable ways.  
Derrida’s most overtly political book is Specters of Marx, and for Derrida, it is the 
spectral that prompts politics. The reason for this prompting is because the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989—for Western neo-liberalism—authorized a “dominant 
discourse…on the subject of Marx’s work and thought…To the rhythm of a cadenced 
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march it proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead and along with it its 
hopes, its discourse, its theories, and its practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live 
the market, here’s to the survival economic and political liberalism!” (Derrida 64). If this 
neoliberal incantation is true, then it follows that Marxism has become a ghost, and, 
ironically, this spectral state is precisely where Communism begins in The Communist 
Manifesto’s iconic opening line. For Derrida, haunting inaugurates politics. To the 
specter of communism, Derrida adds another famous ghost, King Hamlet, and the idea 
that “the time is out of joint” (Hamlet 1. v. 191) to address the irony that pronouncing 
Marxism’s death might be the time Marxism begins to haunt Europe. 
As Derrida makes clear in the “Exordium”, what is at stake for this kind of 
politics, an hauntological politics, is:  
to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the 
companionship, in the commerce without commerce of ghosts. To live otherwise, 
and better. No not better, but more justly. But with them. No being-with the other, 
no socius, without this with that makes being-with in general more enigmatic than 
ever for us, And this being with specters would also be, not only but also, a 
politics of memory, of inheritance, and of generations.  
If I am getting ready to speak at length about ghosts…it is in the name of 
justice (xviii). 
Derrida challenges readers here to attempt to fulfill the impossibly large, but urgent task 
of creating a “better[,] [n]o not better, but more [just]” and livable world for the (animal) 
other.  
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 Before I can begin to work with Derrida’s challenges and ideas, I must make clear 
how I see animals and photographs entering into Derrida’s economy of terms. I do not 
make a one-to-one substitution of animals for ghosts or specters. Likewise, I do not 
consider photographs interchangeable with ghosts or specters. On the other hand, these 
two terms, animal and photograph, put us living humans in touch with the ghostly. Akira 
Mizuta Lippit actually begins his Electric Animal with precisely this point. Although 
“‘Everywhere animals disappear,’ writes John Berger…animals never entirely vanish. 
Rather, they exist in a state of perpetual vanishing. Animals enter a new economy of 
being…[that is] considering modern technological media generally and the cinema more 
specifically, spectral…modernity finds animals lingering in the world undead” (Lippit 1). 
For Lippit, animals are becoming ghostly, which is not quite the same as ghosts plain and 
simple. Where photographs and ghosts are concerned, Bazin, Barthes, and Sontag each 
likewise touch upon the photographic connection to the ghostly or spectral. “Hence,” 
Bazin writes photography demonstrates that “it is no longer as certain as it was that there 
is no middle stage between presence and absence” (Bazin 97).   
The important question Derrida raises in The Animal that Therefore I Am about 
how to approach pathos without charting a pathetic course can begin to be answered by 
photography and the spectral. Cartier-Bresson’s pigs, and Franju’s livestock offer two 
opportunities for becoming-animal and these becomings offer human viewers some sense 
of or belief in an animal’s world while bypassing the rights-based and pathetic attempts 
to advocate for animals. If neoliberal arrogance reaches its fever pitch in the repeated 
“incantation” (Derrida 64) proclaiming capitalism’s triumph over Marxism, then perhaps 
the sorcery of the cinema and the sorcery of becoming-animal comprise counter-spells 
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that decenter the rational human subject—or consumer of images—where the specters of 
animals and photographs become hauntologies and the question of pathos is opened in 
productive, radical ways. Because hauntology is about the problem of inheritance, and 
not about the question of rights, hauntology asks us to think about politics in terms of 
being: “To be, this word in which we earlier saw the word of the spirit, means, for the 
same reason, to inherit. All the questions on the subject of being or of what it is to be (or 
not to be) are questions of inheritance” (Derrida 67). A more just world where animals 
are concerned, a world that avoids “the specter of catastrophic mass extinction” to borrow 
Steven Jay Gould’s poignant phrase (Gould 1296), and a world that slows or even stems 
the perpetual vanishing of animals, must quite literally be conjured up. Film and 
photography are tools of conjuring. They conjure particular kinds of animals in the 
viewer. This conjuring is made possible by becoming-animal where the memories of the 
moviegoer rest alongside the memories of the sorcerer. They remember, perhaps, 
transforming the world in such a way that makes it a better inheritance for whatever 
species can survive into our future.   
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CHAPTER 5. MEDIA ECOLOGY, THOMAS PYNCHON, AND A THEORY OF 
ADAPTATION !!!
5.1. Introduction 
There’s a small scene about a third of the way into Thomas Pynchon’s madcap 
detective novel, Inherent Vice, where Doc Sportello’s friend and confidant Sortilège 
introduces Doc to her boyfriend Spike. It turns out that Spike and his friend Farley 
Branch “would take off on their bikes from time to tome looking for [documentary film 
subjects], both discovering after a while a common interest in respect for the natural 
environment, having seen too much of it napalmed, polluted, defolioated till the laterite 
beneath was sun-baked solid and useless. Farley had already collected dozens of reels’ 
worth of Stateside environmental abuse” (104). There is a certain humor in the idea of 
two Vietnam veterans palling around driving their motorcycles up and down California 
shooting documentary film footage that’s all Pynchon. In Pynchon’s fictional worlds, it is 
not unreasonable for a military man to also be a renaissance man. Geoffrey “Pirate” 
Prentice, for example, proves himself in Gravity’s Rainbow to be an expert British spy, 
evacuating Katje Borgesius out of Holland, and also a successful clairvoyant who has “a 
strange talent for—well, for getting inside the fantasies of others: being able, actually to 
take over the burden of managing them” (Pynchon 12). Lastly, it would be a travesty not
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to mention Pirate’s gardening prowess—the man grows bananas in London, enough to 
sustain perhaps the most memorable meal in all of American literature: the “Banana 
Breakfast” (8). But despite Pynchon’s unceasing sense of humor, the episode with Spike 
and Farley does not elide the horrors of the Vietnam war. Spike introduces himself to 
hippie Doc with shocking frankness that suggests more than a little regret: “Yeah, I’m 
one of them baby killers” (103) and Spike’s introduction succinctly addresses both the 
idea that Spike was probably not in Vietnam willingly, and that he was required to 
perform horrifying tasks while there. In fact, the novel suggests that eco-documentary 
filmmaking is Spike and Farley Branch’s way of coping with the psychological 
difficulties of Spike’s post-war life. 
I want to suggest that this small, seemingly throwaway scene in Inherent Vice is a 
kind of seed or key for thinking about the frequent intrusion of cinema into Pynchon’s 
fictions. Despite its dubious status within the majority of Pynchon criticism, the cinema 
in Pynchon’s novels is not so simply an apparatus of mind control, a Frankensteinian 
monster of the Inanimate, or a demon of entropic illegibility. Cinema is also an antidote 
to the horrors of military duty; cinema is a vehicle of connectivity; cinema is a conductor 
of ecological activism and activity. And although these arguments reach a kind of 
pinnacle in Inherent Vice, they begin to take root in Gravity’s Rainbow.  
 Among the earliest points of critical discussion and fascination surrounding 
Gravity’s Rainbow include mythology, science and mathematics, and cinema. Forty years 
on, scholars from a wide variety of fields and backgrounds remain captivated by 
Pynchon’s knotty, macabre, and hilarious work. And although the ideas and arguments I 
will pursue below will occasionally run counter to critical consensus, I do not intend to 
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work necessarily in opposition to extant criticism where Pynchon and cinema is 
concerned. As many writers have highlighted, Gravity’s Rainbow often enmeshes cinema 
into sinister plots of Pavlovian control, as is the case with the film made of Octopus 
Grigory. Elsewhere, Pynchon’s cinematic writing comprises “perversions of time” 
(Holmes 13), or they are “placed among the other cultural and scientific-technological 
forces that have shaped modern consciousness” for better for worse (Marquez 167). And 
more often than not, scholarly writing on this subject has favored the worse. What I wish 
to accomplish here is additional—not necessarily oppositional—writing that puts 
Pynchon’s “cinematic imagination” (Marquez 167) into a different, ecological (and more 
positive) context. I say additional and not oppositional because I have no interest in 
refuting the idea that the characters of Pynchon’s novel exploit cinema for malevolent 
ends; there is no positive spin to put onto the operant conditioning of an octopus in order 
to manipulate Slothrop, for example, or the violence suffered by actress Margherita 
Erdmann on or off camera.  
Pynchon’s fiction is undeniably complex, and the default critical tactic seems to 
be for scholars to try and match Pynchon’s narrative complexity with theoretical 
complexity. This approach, I would argue does a significant disservice to Pynchon’s 
work. Certainly, Pynchon’s novels demand a certain rigor and sophistication, but rarely 
do critical responses to Pynchon’s fiction address, mirror, or even register the joy, humor, 
or fun of reading Pynchon. Pynchon is only partly the grave techno-phobe who writes 
apocalyptic apocrypha for and about a doomed culture falling in love with its own 
destruction. Only partly. Another aspect of Pynchon’s style and content spontaneously 
breaks into song, enthusiastically laughs at its own bad jokes, and forges puns with 
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admirable shamelessness. The oddball and slapstick impulses in Pynchon’s work are just 
as crucial as the nightmarish and ominous ones. If the books weren’t wicked fun, how 
would people make through the marathon lengths of Against the Day, Mason & Dixon, or 
Gravity’s Rainbow? Too often Pynchon’s yes-even-the-kitchen-sink energy receives little 
more than lip service from scholars, and too often the question of film elicits joyless 
responses that betray both the cinematic spirit of Gravity’s Rainbow and the cinema 
itself. Because critics tend to (over)emphasize the ways in which cinema is used as a tool 
of control while piling on the theoretical elaboration, readers are left with extremely 
complex scholarship that somehow simultaneously lacks nuance. I would argue that one 
way to respond to Pynchon’s sense of humor and style is to re-think the ways in which 
cinema enters into his fiction. 
 
5.2. Part 2, Episode 6 
Roughly one third of the way into Gravity’s Rainbow, in a chapter that begins at a 
party where “some merrymaker has earlier put a hundred grams of hashish in the 
Hollandaise. Word of this has gotten around” (244) there is a short but representative 
passage where Pynchon’s style and cinema are concerned. A man called Blodgett 
Waxwing, “the meanest customer Slothrop has seen outside of a Frankenstein movie—
wearing a white zoot suit with reet pleats and a long gold keychain that swings in flashing 
loops as he crosses the room with a scowl for everybody” engages the novel’s protagonist 
Tyrone Slothrop in the following dialogue: 
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“I want you to hold this for me, till I ask for it back. It looks like Italo is 
going to get here before Tamara, and I’m not sure which one—“ 
“At this rate, Tamara’s gonna get here before tonight,” Slothrop interjects 
in a Groucho Marx voice.” (246) 
In his essay “The Cinematic Imagination in Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow”, 
Antonio Marquez states: “[a]t its worst, Pynchon’s appropriation of movie clichés is silly 
and capricious” (Marquez 166). But to me this characterization could not be further from 
the truth. Pynchon’s silliness and capriciousness is part of what makes his novels so 
great. Even in the brief exchange quoted above, Pynchon’s lively style shines brightly 
enough to temporarily blind readers from the actual plot of the scene. In the midst of 
trying to keep track of who Slothrop is talking to, what contraband he wants Slothrop to 
hang onto, and why, I can’t help but be distracted by Pynchon’s spot-on imitation of a 
Groucho-esque joke that compromises the uneasy feeling I probably ought to have about 
Waxwing the raketeer’s intentions for the book’s hero. As the passage continues, the 
narrator tells us that Waxwing  
has been AWOL off and on since the Battle of the Bulge, and with a death rap for 
that he still goes into U.S. Army bases at night to the canteens to watch the 
movies—provided they’re westerns, he loves those shit-kickers…he’s been 
known to hot-wire a general’s jeep just to travel up to that Poitiers for the evening 
to see a good old Bob Steele or Johnny Mack Brown…he has seen The Return of 
Jack Slade twenty-seven times. (246-7)   
 By the end of this compact episode, the film references go on to include a few more 
icons: King Kong, a sympathetic figure for Gravity’s Rainbow who turns up often, and 
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Errol Flynn, to whom the narrative voice of the novel compares Slothrop a number of 
times.  
 If, as critics have suggested, Gravity’s Rainbow might be read as a film, then 
perhaps it might benefit from some explication alongside film theory. André Bazin once 
put forward the argument that “as good a way as any towards understanding what a film 
is trying to say to us is to know how it is saying it” (30). This I think is a key approach to 
thinking and writing about Pynchon that often goes unexplored in Pynchon criticism. 
Pynchon’s style for this chapter is goofy, comical, and cartoonish. These effects are 
achieved precisely through the narrator and the characters’ incorporation of film 
references. And despite the madcap form the chapter takes, film operates here at a 
number of subtly complex levels. Where it intersects with Slothrop, cinema works to 
support the text and readers’ imagining what they’re reading. Slothrop’s impersonation of 
Groucho Marx allows readers who know and love Groucho to come close to hearing his 
punning of Tamara’s name. (Likewise, the physical comparison of Slothrop to Errol 
Flynn helps readers picture the protagonist’s slender frame and wispy mustache.) Where 
Waxwing is concerned, however, cinema serves as something more than an aid for 
readers’ sensory relation to what a character may look and sound like. Instead, cinema is 
a kind of obsession for Waxwing that he indulges in opposition to, or at the expense of 
military duty. This nuance will become important for me later on in this chapter, but for 
now I want to continue with the book’s specific connections to Bazin’s film theory. 
At first glance, the statement from Bazin might seem to resemble the New Critics’ 
idealization of form matching content, and then perhaps there would be no need to 
consult cinematic Bazin for ideas about literary Pynchon. Gravity’s Rainbow, however, 
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entirely short-circuits the New Critical argument “[t]hat the primary concern of criticism 
is with the problem of unity—the kind of whole which the literary work forms or fails to 
form, and the relation of the various parts to each other in building up this whole 
(Brooks 798). Pynchon’s work generally, but perhaps most of all in Gravity’s Rainbow 
not only “fails” to unify its manifold plots and subplots into a unity, it actively rejects the 
very impulse that prizes totality in the first place. In the introductory essay to his seminal 
book of annotations on Gravity’s Rainbow, Steven C. Wiesenberger insists that “the 
novel approaches, but avoids, closure. It combines the elegance of a preordained structure 
and the unintelligibility of pure coincidence” (10-1).  
The resistance to closure Wiesenberger emphasizes about the book is indeed 
crucial to its themes and to the subject matter it engages. Part of the “approach” toward 
closure, I would argue, is its encyclopedic inclusion of topics ranging from pre-war 
English candies to the nitty-gritty detail of Pavlovian psychology—brushing up against 
the linguistic transformation of Soviet-run Kyrgyzstan, German amusement parks, air 
balloon travel, and Poisson distributions along the way. Another part of the “approach” 
toward closure Wiesenberger mentions concerns mythology. And Gravity’s Rainbow is 
full of mythology. Pynchon manages to create enough space for the Grimm fairy tales, 
Teutonic myths, Christian myths, Kabala, and Herero myths to circulate and brush up 
against one another in the course of the novel—occasionally referencing, re-telling, or 
satirizing more than one at a time. (One good example of the ways disparate myths mix 
with or brush up against one another is explained thoroughly by Wiesenberger’s 
annotation on the character Gottfried. Not only does his name mean “God’s peace” in 
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German, it is also “related specifically to the ancient Teutonic god Frey…a god of peace 
and sexual love” (Wiesenberger 74).)    
Gravity’s Rainbow’s resistance to closure, completion, totalization, unity, etc. 
lines up very closely alongside Bazin’s essay “The Myth of Total Cinema.” Bazin’s essay 
argues that the invention of cinema cannot be limited to economic, technical, or scientific 
invention alone because, “[o]n the contrary, an approximate and complicated 
visualization of an idea invariably precedes the industrial discovery which alone can open 
the way to its practical use” (Bazin 18 italics mine). Bazin’s argument is that cinema’s 
origins are not, as we might expect circa 1895, or in the work of Muybridge, the 
Lumières, Edison, or Marey alone. Instead, cinema could just as easily have begun with 
the “phenakistoscope foreseen as long ago as the sixteenth century” (Bazin 19). Bazin’s 
point here is not to pin down the exact moment of cinema’s origin. Instead, Bazin is 
highlighting the idea that the capacity to imagine cinema precedes its technical 
achievement. 
This reversal that Bazin highlights is closely linked to an important aspect of 
Gravity’s Rainbow. Steven C. Wiesenberger sees many examples of what he calls 
“hysteron proteron: a trope of backward motion, regression, and reversals of cause and 
effect” (34). Most importantly for the novel, the famous V-2 rocket, around which the 
novel is organized, was witnessed to explode before the sound of their arrival. Because of 
the speed at which they fly (i.e. faster than the speed of sound), the rockets’ approach 
could not be heard until after they had hit.  
Somewhat fittingly, perhaps, I have drifted pretty far afield from the particular 
episode I set out to explicate. However, the way cinema enters into that episode is not 
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only typical of its inclusion throughout the novel, it also typifies the ways in which I read 
cinema ecologically within Pynchon’s novel. What Part 2, episode 6 of Gravity’s 
Rainbow suggests is that cinema occupies an important place not only with the cosmos of 
the novel, but that its place informs and mediates some of its most crucial ideas about 
interfaces.  
 
5.3. Gravity’s Rainbow and Media Ecology 
Gravity’s Rainbow is a novel obsessed with interfaces. The novel’s opening 
section, “Beyond the Zero,” introduces the preoccupation with interfaces in a variety of 
contexts. The not-quite-extinct reflex of Pavlovian conditioning that mysteriously persists 
“beyond the zero” of de-conditioning a given stimulus is in some respect the catalyst for 
the entire novel as Tyrone Slothrop’s V-2 rocket-related erections are the focal point of 
the novel’s action. Par for the course in Gravity’s Rainbow are séances in which death is 
merely an interface between one modality and another, Tyrone Slothrop’s frequent and 
paranoid obsession with the interface between what counts as plot (plotted by Them) 
versus coincidence, and a tendency for the novel to use its characters, objects, or mise-en-
scène as interfaces between literary genre and convention—and even to use a given 
object as a seamless interface between subplots and various casts of characters. Referring 
to setting here as mise-en-scène is entirely deliberate because in many respects Gravity’s 
Rainbow more closely resembles a film than a novel.  
Many scholars who work with and study Gravity’s Rainbow note the frequency 
with which cinema enters into the novel, and cinema’s general importance to both the 
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novel’s plot and its meanings. Too often scholarly discussions of film in Gravity’s 
Rainbow have only to do with Pynchon’s critique of technology and its proclivity for a 
mechanized society. John R. Holmes’s essay “‘A Hand to Turn the Time’: History as 
Film in Gravity’s Rainbow” argues, for example, that in Gravity’s Rainbow, “Calculus, 
film, and fatalism are all perversions of time that Pynchon seems to want excluded from 
his theory of history” (Holmes 13). Donald Larsson, one of Pynchon’s earliest and most 
esteemed critics claims that “In fact most of Pynchon’s references to film have negative 
connotations. There are some exceptions concerning animated cartoons and the more 
anarchic comedians such as the Marx brothers and W.C. Fields, but for the most part, 
cinema is associated with decadence, death, and questions of power and control. Going to 
the movies is a form of false consciousness” (Larsson 103-4). Although it is not my 
primary focus here, I would argue that Larsson’s statements are true—or truest—when 
the novel is talking about films that only exist within the world of the book, and that 
when King Kong, or Errol Flynn, to name two frequent references, come to the fore, the 
cinema does not signify death, control, etc. Nevertheless, cinema enters into the novel’s 
concern for interfaces in several ways and these entrances produce interesting, if 
controversial results which usually go ignored in the majority of scholarly writing on 
Gravity’s Rainbow. Victoria de Zwaan’s analysis in “Gravity's Rainbow as Metaphoric 
Narrative: Film, Fairy Tale and Fantasy in Pynchon's Germany” is a helpful departure 
from the kind of responses characterized by Holmes and Larsson. De Zwaan argues that 
“[a]s Slothrop starts to live his life as if it were a movie, he comes to perceive himself as 
a fictional character” (de Zwaan 157). And although this strategy does not in the end 
work out well for Slothrop, it does point to a crucial aspect of Pynchon’s use of cinema, 
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that is, as a tool or catalyst of transformation, the site or interface between two realities 
within and beyond the novel. 
Perhaps the crux of cinema’s status within Gravity’s Rainbow’s cosmos lies with 
Alpdruken (or Alpdrüken, the umlaut inconsistently applied throughout the book), 
Gerhardt Von Göll’s fictional film within Pynchon’s novel. Like many characters in the 
novel, Gerhardt Von Göll (aka Der Springer) and his fictional film Alpdruken appear 
sporadically, peppered throughout the novel. (Alpdruken, incidentally, is the most 
obvious example of a film that only exists within the pages of Pynchon’s novel.) As 
Steven C. Weisenburger’s annotative companion to the novel explains, the film’s title is a 
splinter of the name of “[t]he dog in [Ned] Pointsman’s dream, Reichssieger von Thanatz 
Alpdrucken…[who] has fragmented and the parts of his name now begin to 
metamorphose…The term Alpdrucken derives from an old folk belief that the devil rode 
men as if they were horses, so that by morning their ‘mane’ (hair) would be tangled and 
their bodies dripping with perspiration” (229). The dog Pointsman dreams about is a 
national dog show champion Wiemaraner. The easy interpretation of Von Göll’s film title 
is that images are nightmarish. To varying degrees, Pynchon’s critics promote this 
interpretation by appealing to the techno-phobic aspects of his work, and doubling down 
on them where film is concerned. I want to suggest, on the other hand, a slightly more 
nuanced and detailed interpretation. The title, Alpdruken places the nightmare of 
domination into the cinematic register. Neither animals nor images are nightmarish, but 
the way in which they become sites of domination definitely is. The etymological 
connection to Grimm equates nightmare with being ridden like a horse. One might 
suspect that a human transforming into a horse would be nightmarish, but Pynchon seems 
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to be more or less at ease with blurring the distinctions between human and animal. 
Pynchon seems to delight, for example in pigs. Slothrop not only has a pig companion 
following him around “In the Zone”, but he even becomes a kind of ceremonial pig called 
“Plechazunga, the Pig-Hero” (Pynchon 567). References to pigs (and especially to Porky 
Pig) in Pynchon’s work has even precipitated a scholarly article devoted to the matter (“A 
Note on ‘Porky Pig and the Anarchist’ in The Crying of Lot 49 and Gravity’s Rainbow” 
was penned by Mark Irwin in 1991. Much more so than by blurred distinctions between 
human and animal, Pynchon’s novels are disturbed by instances where human and 
machine or organic and inorganic become indistinct from one another.) The nightmare in 
Grimm is the domination and aggression implied by the “tangled…bodies dripping with 
perspiration.” Where the Weimaraner is concerned, I would argue that his name registers 
the nightmare of dog shows where animals are judged on their “ability” to be trained and 
controlled by humans who exploit their bodies and behaviors for vain and meaningless 
prestige. So in both etymological cases, Alpdruken signifies the nightmare of domination, 
rather than of images. Besides clarifying the nightmarish qualities of Alpdruken, which 
admittedly the cinema remains open to facilitating, what I want to investigate further is 
the significance of cinema as a vehicle of transformation within the imagination of the 
novel. It begins—even where cinema is at its most nefarious within the book—to acquire 
a particular kind of (positive) ecological valence when considered in light of what has 
come to be termed media ecology. 
Following a gloss on Vandana Shiva’s concept of Earth Democracy, a concept 
that attempts to place individuals within a broad context that pays homage to “the Indian 
concept of vasudhaiva kutumbakam, [meaning] Earth Family” (López viii), Antonio 
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López’s book The Media Ecosystem lays out a provisional definition and raison d’être 
for media ecology:  
[b]ecause corporate media and gadget companies promote technological 
‘progress’ while excluding living systems from our awareness, organic media 
practitioners are charged with the responsibility of incorporating an Earth 
perspective into their engagement with media ecosystems…As a space of 
appearance that shapes our interconnected reality, the mediasphere can make 
visible the spirit of the Earth. (López viii-ix)     
Despite the occasionally awkward phrase (“organic media practitioners”, “Earth 
perspective”, etc.), López’s ideas here comprise an ecological response to the problem of 
a Liberal Human subject, whose sense of individuality is propped up by media that 
“exclud[es] living systems from our awareness” (López viii).  
Gravity’s Rainbow thematizes this concern over an individual functioning within 
various systems memorably. With a smile that’s perhaps a bit too wide, the book never 
quite allows its main character Tyrone Slothrop (or readers) to know for certain whether 
the events and encounters that befall Slothrop are plotted for him by shadowy bureaucrats 
or “‘Random.’ A tragic, actressy smile…‘Another fairy-tale word’” (Pynchon 395). The 
scene that includes this quotation happens to occur in a movie studio, where Alpdruken 
was filmed and the conversation is between Slothrop and a once-famous (within the 
novel) German actress called Margherita Erdmann, who starred in Alpdruken. Not only 
does the fictional film function in the novel as a connective passage from two distinct 
eras of German history, it also provides a semi-literal backdrop to the crucial theme of 
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Slothrop as a possible or probably pawn, manipulated and plotted against—where 
randomness is a fairy tale.  
The friendship between Slothrop and Erdmann is central to the novel, but cinema 
enters into discussions of interfaces, and travelling through them, likewise in moments 
that only seem insignificant or fleeting: “Kevin Spectro did not differentiate between 
Outside and Inside. He saw the cortex as an interface organ, mediating between the two, 
but part of them both. ‘When you’ve looked at how it really is,’ he asked once, ‘how can 
we, any of us, be separate?’ He is my Pierre Janet, Pointsman thought…Here’s a medium 
shot, himself backlit, alone at the high window in the Grand Hotel, whisky glass tipped at 
the bright subarctic sky…” (142). Here again the novel takes recourse to the cinema—or 
at least to cinematic language—in order to mediate between the two sides of an interface.  
The place, however, where cinema comprises an interface between two realities 
most strikingly in the novel is at the end. As Pynchon’s massive novel draws to a 
climactic close, the novel lifts readers out of 1945 Germany and plunges them back down 
into 1973 Los Angeles. The shift the novel’s setting is absolutely shocking. It is shocking 
even despite the jokes and anachronisms that point outside the time and space where the 
novel is set. Nevertheless, after roaming through seven hundred pages literally “In the 
Zone” of Europe during the days immediately following V-E Day, suddenly reading 
about the nuances of Los Angeles freeway traffic, and movie theatre manager Richard M. 
Zhlubb, in 1970’s L.A. is completely bewildering. Although biographical details about 
Pynchon are as hard to come by as water in the desert, Pynchon’s friends attest in various 
interviews and essays that Gravity’s Rainbow was written in a Manhattan Beach 
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apartment, across town from where the novel ends (Tse, “Photos: Thomas Pynchon’s 
Apartment in Manhattan Beach, the City that Inspired Inherent Vice”).  
 Pynchon could have ended the book any number of places—even a place like 
Camp Pendleton might make more sense considering this is a book chiefly about the final 
days of WWII—but Pynchon ends Gravity’s Rainbow in the Orpheus (a slightly 
fictionalized iteration of the Orpheum) Theatre amid a lively crowd rapt in anticipation 
of…something readers don’t quite grasp even after the novel ends. Like the V-2 rocket at 
the center of the novel, cinema exits the atmosphere of clear-cut fiction and re-enters 
elsewhere, at a fictionalized version of the actual time and space of the novel’s 
composition. That this re-entry occurs in a movie-theatre only highlights cinema’s 
importance in the thrust of the narrative, and indeed cinema permeates the entirety of 
Pynchon’s text, not only its ending. 
 The connective function cinema enacts in Gravity’s Rainbow, facilitating the 
movement across a multitude of interfaces participates in the concept of media ecology. 
In addition to the ideas about media ecology as a confrontation with the systems 
individuals are a part of and circulate within, media ecology is also a concept that 
addresses a particular valence of transformation. Matthew Fuller’s book Media Ecology 
sets the course for his writing about the term thus: “objects here should also be 
understood to mean processes embodied as objects, as elements in a composition. Every 
element is an explosion, a passion or capacity settled temporarily into what passes for a 
stable state” (Fuller 1). Media ecology’s relation to actual scientific or biological ecology 
is admittedly metaphorical. Fuller acknowledges that the  
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term ‘ecology’ is used here because it is one of the most expressive language has 
to indicate the massive and dynamic interrelation of processes and objects, beings 
and things, patterns and matter…‘Media ecology,’ or more often ‘information 
ecology,’ is deployed as a euphemism for the allocation of informational roles in 
organizations and in computer supported collaborative work…Of keen interest 
too in such contexts is how information flows are routed within an organization. 
(Fuller 2-3)  
Although the term may be a “euphemism” or metaphor, Fuller’s and López’s use of 
media ecology is by no means a corruption of ecology as such.  
Manuel De Landa argues that where ecology is concerned, “In many respects, the 
circulation is what matters, not the particular forms that it causes to emerge” (De Landa 
104). This is the ecological context in which to read what cinema does in Gravity’s 
Rainbow. Certainly cinema has the capacity to hold a form, which opens it up to control 
or violence, or any of the trappings that critics usually highlight. But regardless, cinema 
is for better or worse, in the business of transformation—the cinema circulates 
information, plots, characters, objects, and fantasies from one setting to another. De 
Landa goes on to say that, “the emergence of an eco-system is typically described as a 
succession of plant assemblages that interact with each other, passing through several 
stable states until they reach a ‘climax’” (De Landa 105). Incidentally, one could say 
nearly the exact same thing to describe cinema instead of an ecosystem—that any given 
still image will appear to be a stable state (i.e. a photograph), but is actually part of a 
chain of succession. Pynchon’s novel ends as a rocket falls toward an unexpecting 
audience clamoring for the projectionist to “Come-on! Start the show!” (760).  
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As the rocket falls and readers finish the book, we realize that actually its impact 
occurs during the very first words of the novel when “A screaming comes across the sky. 
It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now” (3). The “before” in 
this sentence actually means “after” if one is reading the book for the first time, and the 
reason that there is no grounds for comparison is because one has presumably not yet 
read about any of the rockets launched and detonated later on in the book. But this 
ending, which sends readers back across the interface of the book’s physical cover, to the 
beginning of the book, is once more facilitated by the cinema. The spectators on the last 
page presumably get their wish for the show to start when the first page begins to be read. 
There are a lot of things happening here. The novel ends with a transformation from 
novel to film, where the apparent stability of each state is perpetually compromised or 
transformed by the novel’s end. This transformation aligns cinema’s function within the 
novel with what theorists have termed media ecology. But it also opens up a particular 
kind of space for thinking about relationships between literature and the cinema. And 
about how we think about adaptations.  
There is a chapter dedicated to Gravity’s Rainbow and Luigi Piradello’s Shoot! In 
a recent book devoted to literature’s relationship with screens called Between Page and 
Screen: Remaking Literature Through Cinema and Cyberspace. Lovorka Gruic Grmusa 
and Kiene Brillenburg Wurth’s essay, “Cinematography as a Literary Concept in the 
(Post)Modern Age: Pirandello to Pynchon” argues that Gravity’s Rainbow uses cinema to 
demonstrate the impossibility of non-mediated consciousness and “as a ‘mainstream’ 
machine” whose potential for artistic expression has been swallowed up by a “cultural 
colonization” (195). I would argue that Grmusa and Wurth’s characterization of the 
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cinema in Gravity’s Rainbow has actually very little to do with Gravity’s Rainbow. Their 
reading is not necessarily unfair or inaccurate, but I think that their conclusions belong in 
a context that is much broader than Pynchon’s book.  
In fact, the argument that cinema’s potential is only rarely glimpsed amid the 
mass-produced and mass-consumed films of Hollywood is one of film theory’s oldest 
arguments. Dziga Vertov wrote in 1923 “The cinema of yesterday and today is merely a 
commercial affair. Cinema’s path of development has been dictated solely by 
considerations of profit, And it’s hardly surprising that the extensive commerce in motion 
pictures—illustrations of novels, romances, Pinkerton serials—has dazzled and attracted 
production workers” (36). Little changed on this front for the generation of cinephiles 
following Vertov’s. According to a hilarious account from Benjamin Péret: 
With cinema not only is anything possible, but the marvelous itself is placed 
within reach. And yet never have we seen such a disproportion between the 
immensity of its possibilities and the mediocrity of its results…[but it has also] 
developed into an industry governed by sordid market forces incapable of 
distinguishing a work of the mind from a sack of flour. Nothing counts more for a 
producer than the return he may get on the millions he has shelled out on some 
idiot’s legs, some cretin’s voice. The net result of such an attitude can only be an 
interminable series of films devoid of the slightest interest—when they are not, 
frankly, odious and stupid—films that skillfully and purposefully set out to 
anaesthetize the public. (59) 
And in 1958, seven years after Péret ‘s indictment, Luis Buñuel lamented, “In none of the 
traditional arts does there exist a disproportion as great as in the cinema between 
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possibility and realization…Unfortunately the vast majority of current cinemas appear to 
have no other mission than this: their screens wallow in the moral and intellectual vacuity 
on which the cinema thrives, a cinema that limits itself” (112-3). Even as film theory 
became more philosophically complex and pursued discussions on semiotics, politics, 
and psychoanalysis, the idea that mainstream cinema criminally disappoints its potential 
persists. Near the beginning of his famous book, Psychoanalysis and the Cinema, 
Christian Metz extends the relationship between cinema’s commercial endeavors to 
comment specifically on audiences’ willingness to have its desires co-opted by the studio 
system’s interests: “Let me insist once again, the cinematic institution is not just the 
cinema industry (which works to fill cinemas, not to empty them), it is also the mental 
machinery—another industry—which spectators ‘accustomed to the cinema’ have 
internalised historically and which has adapted them to the consumption of films” (7). 
 And so rather than a revelation, it should come as absolutely no surprise 
whatsoever, let alone a critical insight, that Thomas Pynchon would register cinema’s 
capacity to manipulate or “anaesthetize” audiences. And so certainly, cinema 
occasionally takes on a nefarious role within Gravity’s Rainbow, but it does so within the 
context of a novel that’s all about allowing for all kinds of transformations—not only 
between living and dead (a transformation that has been a central concern for film theory 
for decades) but also between various states of what cinema can be. The idea the cinema 
is a continuously developing and changing art (not unlike other art forms such as the 
novel or painting)  is concretized among Gravity’s Rainbow’s final sentences. After an 
ambiguous technical malfunction, caused perhaps by a burned out lightbulb (recalling the 
unforgettable scenes of the book involving Byron the Bulb) or a problem with the film 
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strip itself,  “in the dark and awful expanse of screen something has kept on, a film we 
have not learned to see…it is now a closeup of the face, a face we all know—” (760). 
Hand-in-hand with the hopes for new and radical incarnations of the cinema  on the part 
of the film theorists who see cinema as perpetually infantile, Pynchon ends his book with 
an unspecified new kind of film that audiences much catch up with, moving from an 
unprecedented cinematic transformation across the interface of the screen into the 
experience of the audience, who perhaps must respond to the film (which becomes the 
beginning of the book) by learning to see anew.    
 
5.4. Adaptation 
 I want to conclude this dissertation in a similar area to where it began, with 
theory. I began by thinking about the ways and places where ecological, posthuman, and 
animal studies might enter into discussions about film in ways other than representation. 
And I would like to end by contributing some theoretical arguments of my own. My 
argument is simple: discussions about cinematic adaptation can become more lively by 
thinking about adaptation in more Darwinian terms. Thinking about the question of 
fidelity in cinematic adaptations, Sergio Rizzo points out that “in moving beyond fidelity 
criticism, these scholars leave little room for the concept of ‘infidelity’” (Rizzo 299). One 
way to think more (and perhaps better) about adaptations’ infidelity is to consider the 
Darwinian sense of the word adaptation. Put crudely, to judge or evaluate a film 
adaptation according to how faithful it is to its literary ancestor would be like expecting a 
cheetah to swim simply because its ancestors were acquatic. Adaptations are the genetic 
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mutations of DNA sequences that produce new traits from one generation to another, 
eventually culminating in new species, and according to Evolutionary theory, these 
changes are meant to increase an organism’s fitness for a given environment or habitat.  
Right in the middle of Stephen Jay Gould’s massive work, The Structure of 
Evolutionary Theory, which serves here as my evolutionary guide, Gould includes a 
small section titled “A Personal Odyssey” which explains a shift in his thinking about 
species selection. Gould justifies this personal writing by pointing out that  
[m]any historians of science, particularly feminists like Donna Harraway 
(sic)…have forcefully argued that scholars can strike their most effective blows 
against the myth of pure objectivism by being candid about the interaction of their 
own autobiographies with they current claims—thus exposing the inevitable (and 
basically welcome) cultural and psychological embeddedness of science, while 
operating an author’s prejudice both to his own scrutiny, and to the examination 
of his readers. (Gould 670)         
The problem of what Gould calls “pure objectivism” is that although scientific research 
attempts to minimize biases in order to garner the most reliable data possible, one must 
address acknowledge and confront the very real structural and institutional biases that 
inform “unbiased” research. An example here of confronting “the myth of pure 
objectivism” would ask why some kinds of research agendas get funding and others do 
not. Or one might argue that “unbiased” reseach does not yield “neutral” results—that 
scientific findings are often deeply political (research on climate change or species 
depopulation, for example.) Gould’s appeal to Haraway’s personal writing, which she 
intensifies in “Notes of a Sportswriter’s Daughter”, inserted into Haraway’s work on 
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companion species in both The Companion Species Manifesto and When Species Meet, 
strikes me as an appropriate place to bridge Pynchon and evolutionary theory. As many 
scholars argue, Gravity’s Rainbow is absolutely in the business of striking blows “against 
the myth of pure objectivism.” And it is in this spirit of confronting one’s personal biases 
and limitations as a scientist, theorist, or writer of any kind that want to make clear that I 
am not a biologist and my knowledge of evolution and Darwin does not approach 
expertise. My aim here is to simply engage the spirit or sentiment of evolutionary theory 
in order to model what an ecocritical or ecocinematic conversation about film adaptations 
might look like precisely among those of us who are not ecologists or biologists by 
training. After all the whole point of interdisciplinary research, it seems to me, is not to 
go around planting the flag of expertise in more and more fields, but to expand the range 
and capacities of one’s field—the goal is biodiversity, not colonization. 
 Although Pynchon does not exactly include his autobiography into either 
Gravity’s Rainbow or Inherent Vice—the first of Pynchon’s texts to be adapted into a 
film—he does absolutely call attention to the time and place of his novels’ writing, of 
their compositional moment in time and space—which is about as much autobiography as 
the elusive and mysterious Thomas Pynchon is ever likely to engage. (One could argue 
that the introduction to the collection of his short stories, Slow Learner, wades into 
autobiographical waters, but it amounts mostly to Pynchon being charmingly critical of 
his own early writing.) And because of Pynchon’s notoriously minimal public life, one of 
the most frequent points of contention leading up to, and immediately following, the 
release of Paul Thomas Anderson’s adaptation of Inherent Vice was the question of 
whether Thomas Pynchon would have a cameo appearance on screen. The question is 
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irresistible for Pynchon fans. Everyone knows that the only widely available photographs 
of Pynchon were taken fifty years ago, long before he became famous. 
 But in none of the fan-boy obsessing over the question of if or where in 
Anderson’s Inherent Vice Pynchon might make a cameo does anyone seem to consider 
what it might mean for Pynchon to break his self-imposed prohibition on being 
photographed. Despite the fact that the release of the film might represent the moment 
Pynchon fans have all been waiting for, no one really seems prepared to respond to 
Pynchon’s image. I would argue that Pynchon’s much-rumored and searched-for cameo 
in Inherent Vice amounts to a vestigial trait within the body of the film. Pynchon’s 
appearance, while serving no clear purpose, is nevertheless a kind of reminder of the 
film’s origins.  
 I want to end by returning to the discussion of the brief scene in Inherent Vice 
where two Vietnam vets are involved in travelling the California coast photographing and 
documenting environmental damages. At first glance, one might consider this scene as a 
part of the representation-based ecocinema I set out to work beyond. Žižek’s insight 
about liberation being about more than representation and the “right to narrate” (190) 
does, however, discard these concerns—the key phrase is perhaps “not limited to.” What 
I find so intriguing about Spike and Farley’s hobby is that the novel, and they, position it 
as a noble activity that somehow works against what they did in Vietnam. Whether they 
see their eco-documentaries as anti- or de-militaristic is unclear, but their penitent attitude 
and the sheepish way Spike refers to his being in Vietnam, makes a stark contrast 
between military and ecocinematic activities. I like this moment from the novel so well 
because it moves eco-documentary filmmaking into more interesting territory than mere 
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eco-advocacy—namely, by positioning ecological filmmaking as a project that works, at 
least in principle, against the mentalities that fuelled and motivated the Vietnam war. The 
effect here is not just to make things more complicated than they need to be. Žižek’s 
point is that representation-based projects, regardless of the liberation they struggle for, 
will not take hold unless they do something more than create positive representations.  
 In many ways this dissertation has been about looking for ways to extend the 
scholarly conversation about cinema and Ecocriticism beyond the domain of 
representation. I do not mean to simply dismiss concerns over representation; obviously, 
as I mentioned in my introduction, I am invested in a diverse cinema. But I remain 
somewhat unsatisfied by the simple substitution of animals or the environment into well-
worn conversations about marginalization, and so I have looked for opportunities and 
openings for different kinds of discussion concerning how film and photography might 
address ecology, animals, and the (post)human. This tactic has produced chapters that 
vary from each other in terms of their subject matter and so in the future, I see this project 
developing into two or more discrete projects. I would, for instance, like to incorporate 
more of Thomas Pynchon’s writing into my thoughts about his fiction. Against the Day 
might be an important next place for my work to turn, considering the novel is set during 
the turn-of-the century, when cinema was still a very new invention. Likewise, I would 
like to develop my work with Virilio and De Landa where drones and film are concerned. 
My second chapter focuses heavily on Koyaanisqatsi, a film which I treasure, but I would 
like to continue writing in the future on the kinds of convergence I pick up on between 
Koyaanisqatsi’s style and drones (and what drones represent vis-à-vis militarization.) 
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 For now, I think I have carved out a few different paths that demonstrate the range 
of my interests—including several different eras of film theory, animals, Pynchon, etc.—
but also a commitment to writing about these interests in ways that avoid retreading 
popular critical conversations by attempting to think through several ideas or approaches 
at once, “lay[ing] everything out…on a single page, the same sheet” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 9). The process, of determining not only what to write about, but also of how to 
arrange my chapters has been difficult, but in many respects the approaches taken by the 
classes I took from my committee members has been a constant encouragement to 
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